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INTRODUCTION 
There are few sure things in life except death, taxes, and, it seems, 
skyrocketing political campaign costs.1  With each election cycle, 
campaign spending reaches new highs.2  Total election spending for 
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 1 I have contemporized a famous quote by Benjamin Franklin.  See Letter from Benjamin 
Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN, 1789–1790, at 68–69 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., Norwood Press. 1907) (“[I]n 
this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”).   
 2 See, e.g., Dan Egen, House, Senate Campaigns, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2010, at A1 (noting that 
House and Senate candidate combined spending for the 2010 midterms will set a 
record); Election 2010 to Shatter Spending Records as Republicans Benefit from Late Cash Surge, 
OPENSECRETS BLOG (Oct. 27, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/
10/election-2010-to-shatter-spending-r.html [hereinafter Election 2010] (noting that fed-
eral election spending for the 2010 midterms is projected to “obliterate spending 
records” for a midterm election, surpassing the previous record set in 2006); id. (observ-
ing that spending has increased during each of the last three successive midterm elec-
tions).  The 2008 presidential election was the “most expensive presidential election in 
history.”  Susan Page, Poll:  Too Much Money Spent on Presidential Campaign, USA TODAY, 
(Oct. 29, 2008, 11:34 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-
10-29-poll_N.htm; see Ellen L. Weintraub & Jason K. Levine, Campaign Finance and the 
2008 Elections:  How Small Change(s) Can Really Add Up, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
461, 461 (2009) (remarking that “[t]he 2008 election saw the largest amount of money 
ever raised during an election cycle”); see also Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, 2008 
Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Summarized:  Receipts Nearly Double 2004 To-
tal (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.
shtml [hereinafter FEC Press Release] (announcing that 2008 presidential candidate and 
convention committee spending topped $1.8 billion in an 80% increase over 2004 levels); 
Presidential Campaign Receipts, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/press/
press2009/20090608Pres/1_OverviewPresFinActivity1996–2008.pdf (illustrating that pres-
idential campaign receipts have increased during each of the last three successive presi-
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the 2010 midterms was enough to provide every American with a Big 
Mac and french fries.3  The increasing need for fundraising is prob-
lematic because, as the Supreme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo in 
1976, candidate reliance on private contributions raises the specter of 
corruption, in which large contributors seek favors in return for their 
donations.4  It is no wonder that polls suggest Americans believe 
money is corrupting the political system and that they support public 
financing systems.5 
The Buckley Court provided a way to avoid the potentially corrupt-
ing influence of private campaign financing by upholding the consti-
tutionality of public financing systems.6  But as private campaign 
spending keeps hitting new highs, public campaign financing be-
comes less and less of an attractive option for candidates.  Publicly fi-
nanced candidates, who are subject to expenditure limitations, risk 
not being heard in the face of high spending by an opponent.  In 
2008, Barack Obama became the first presidential candidate to de-
cline to participate in public financing during the general election 
 
dential elections).  A comprehensive survey of recent state election spending is far 
beyond the scope of this Comment, but a few articles are illustrative.  See, e.g., Associated 
Press, Brown, Whitman Set Election Spending Record, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 22, 2010), 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/news/ap/politics/2010/Oct/22/brown__whitman_set
_election_spending_record.html (explaining that the 2010 California governor’s race is 
“the most expensive general election race in state history”); Mark Niquette & Darrel Row-
land, State Candidates Broke Election–Spending Records, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, (Dec. 11, 
2010, 2:57 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2010/12/11
/state–candidates–broke–election–spending–records.html (discussing spending records 
set during the 2010 election for governor and other state offices in Ohio); Press Release, 
Wis. Democracy Campaign, Record $37.4 Million Spent In Governor’s Race, (Feb. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.wisdc.org/pr020811.php (declaring that the amount spent 
on the 2010 Wisconsin governor’s race set a spending record at a level over four times 
that of 1998). 
 3 Election 2010, supra note 2. 
 4 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (per curiam). 
 5 See, e.g., Stan Greenberg et al., Strong Campaign Finance Reform, GREENBERG QUINLAN 
ROSNER RESEARCH, tbl.1 (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.greenbergresearch.com/articles/
2425/5613_Campaign%20Finance%20Memo_Final.pdf (finding a large majority of vot-
ers believe that “[m]embers of Congress are controlled by groups that fund campaigns” 
at the expense of ordinary citizens); Page, supra note 2, (discussing poll in which nearly 
three out of four Americans support maintaining the presidential election financing sys-
tem with either voluntary or mandatory participation by candidates); Celinda Lake et al., 
Election Week Polling on Fair Elections Act and Money in Campaigns, LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS 
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://fairelectionsnow.org/sites/default/files/11-2010-fairelections-
polling.pdf (explaining that around three out of four voters believe that it is “very or 
somewhat urgent . . . to take action . . . to reduce the influence of wealthy special interests 
on our elections” and that the amount of money spent on political ads in 2010 “poses a 
real threat to the fairness of our elections and the ability of Congress to get results on our 
most important issues”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96, 108. 
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since the system’s creation.7  Many have suggested that the presiden-
tial public financing system upheld in Buckley has simply become ob-
solete,8 at least for credible candidates;9 there are currently efforts 
seeking the system’s repeal.10 
In an era of ever-increasing campaign spending, states have also 
faced the challenge of structuring public financing systems for state 
elections which attract candidate participation.  The solution relied 
upon by a number of states has been to include “trigger” (also known 
as “rescue” or “matching”) funding provisions in their public financ-
ing systems.11  Designed to enable a publicly financed candidate to 
remain competitive against a high-spending opponent, these critical 
provisions typically provide for the distribution of an additional sub-
sidy to a participating candidate when his opponent crosses certain 
spending thresholds.12 
In the past, privately financed candidates brought challenges to 
rescue provisions on the grounds that they served as a burden on 
their speech in violation of the First Amendment.13  Such challengers 
argued that they were chilled from speaking because doing so could 
trigger the distribution of an additional subsidy to their opponent 
under a rescue provision.14  Almost uniformly, every circuit that con-
sidered this claim rejected it.15 
 
 7 Michael Luo & Jeff Zeleny, Reversing Stand, Obama Declines Public Financing, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 2008, at A1. 
 8 See Eliza Newlin Carney, Who Killed Public Financing?, NAT’L J. (Jan. 31, 2011, 7:17 AM), 
http://nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/who-killed-public-financing-of-
presidential-elections—20110130 (exploring the question of who killed the presidential 
public financing system); Editorial, Don’t Put Out that Match, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2011, at 
A18 (characterizing the presidential public financing system as “broken”); Jim Kuhn-
henn, Too Much Money in Politics?  Ain’t Seen Nothing Yet, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2010, 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2010/11/08/too_much_
money_in_politics_aint_seen_nothing_yet/ (“‘The public financing system is going to 
look like a relic by the time we get to 2012.’”) (quoting campaign adviser). 
 9 Weintraub & Levine, supra note 2, at 475 (“Serious candidates will not return to the pub-
lic financing system unless and until the program provides sufficient funding to enable 
participating candidates to be competitive with the amount of money a non-participating 
candidate can raise and spend.”); cf. FEC Press Release, supra note 2 (“The Obama cam-
paign’s total receipts of $745.7 million for the 2008 election are equivalent to more than 
half of the $1.49 billion provided in public funds to all presidential candidates, parties, 
and conventions since the inception of the public funding program.”). 
 10 See Simmi Aujla, House Votes to End Public Financing, POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2011, 3:46 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/48243.html (discussing a House bill seek-
ing to end public financing for presidential campaigns). 
 11 See discussion infra Part II-A. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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This Comment explores the constitutionality of trigger provisions 
after the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in 2008 in Davis v. FEC.16  The 
Davis case concerned the constitutionality of the “Millionaire’s 
Amendment” to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.17  Un-
der this provision, the contribution limits for a candidate for Con-
gress were relaxed when the candidate faced an opponent who chose 
to self-finance his campaign.18  The self-financing candidate’s contri-
bution limit, however, remained the same.19  The Davis Court found 
that the scheme imposed an “unprecedented penalty” on a self-
financing candidate’s campaign speech because his spending would 
result in higher contribution limits for his opponent.20 
Davis was not a public financing case, but both courts and com-
mentators have argued that its logic compels the conclusion that trig-
ger provisions are now unconstitutional.21  In the aftermath of Davis, 
two circuits, the Second and the Eleventh, have found trigger provi-
sions unconstitutional.22  The Ninth Circuit found Arizona’s trigger 
provision constitutional in McComish v. Bennett,23 but the Supreme 
Court has now agreed to hear the case, with many suggesting that the 
decision will be overturned.24  There is much at stake, as matching 
funding is critical to ensuring the financial viability of, and participa-
tion in, public financing systems. 
The Comment is divided into five main parts.  The first part out-
lines the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Buckley; its analysis is 
essential to any consideration of issues relating to campaign finance 
law.  The second part discusses the lower court case law on rescue 
 
 16 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 17 Id. at 728–29. 
 18 Id. at 729 & n.4. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 739. 
 21 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 22 Id. 
 23 McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 525 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 644 (Nov. 
29, 2010) (mem.). 
 24 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices to Assess Arizona Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 
2010, at A21 (“There is reason to think the Supreme Court will find . . . [trigger fund-
ing] . . . problematic.”); Rick Hasen, The Big Campaign Finance Story of 2011:  An Effective 
End to Public Financing, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS, (Nov. 28, 2010) 
http://summaryjudgments.lls.edu/2010/11/it–is–with–great–pleasure.html (“I expect 
the Court . . . to reverse the Ninth Circuit and strike down the Arizona public financing 
system.”); see also Amanda Terkel, Supreme Court Takes Aim Yet Again at Campaign Finance 
Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/11/29/supreme-court-clean-elections-law-mccomish-bennett_n_789353.html 
(“Campaign finance reform advocates generally agreed that the Supreme Court will likely 
strike down the trigger provision in Arizona’s Clean Elections Law.”). 
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funding prior to Davis, which almost universally found such provi-
sions to be constitutional.  The third part looks at the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC.  The fourth part discusses the lower 
court case law after Davis.  The fifth part closely analyzes the Davis 
decision to suggest that in fact, it does not make rescue provisions 
constitutionally problematic, and the Supreme Court should decide 
as much in McComish. 
I.  BUCKLEY’S FIRST PRINCIPLES:  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS, EXPENDITURE LIMITS, AND THE PUBLIC 
FINANCING OF ELECTIONS 
A. Background on Buckley and FECA 
The Watergate scandal of the early 1970s illustrated the need for 
comprehensive campaign finance reform to eliminate political cor-
ruption.25  In 1974, Congress addressed “national cries for change” by 
substantially amending the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).26  
Originally passed in 1971, FECA,27 as amended, contained both cam-
paign contribution and expenditure limitations.28  The expenditure 
limitations consisted of several restrictions:  A limit on the overall 
amount a political candidate could spend; a limit on the amount of 
personal or family funds a candidate could spend; and a $1000 limit 
on independent expenditures that a group could make on behalf of a 
candidate in a given election.29  The contribution limitations re-
stricted individuals or groups from giving more than $1000 to a can-
didate per election and capped overall annual contributions by a giv-
en individual to federal candidates at $25,000.30  The modifications to 
FECA also expanded the existing public financing system for presi-
dential elections, which provided participants with a public subsidy in 
 
 25 See Jason B. Frasco, Note, Full Public Funding:  An Effective and Legally Viable Model for Cam-
paign Finance Reform in the States, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 737 (2007) (“[T]he scandals of 
the Watergate era . . . brought the potential corruption inherent in campaign financing 
to the forefront of American politics.”). 
 26 E. Stewart Crosland, Note, Failed Rescue:  Why Davis v. FEC Signals the End to Effective Clean 
Elections, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1271 (2009). 
 27 For the original statute, see Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–225, 
86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (1994 & Supp. 1999)).  For 
the 1974 version of FECA, see Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 (1988)).   
 28 Frasco, supra note 25, at 737. 
 29 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (per curiam). 
 30 Id. at 7. 
1146 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
return for abiding by a cap on overall expenditures.31  In addition to 
establishing a number of candidate disclosure requirements, the 
amended Act also created the Federal Election Commission, a bipar-
tisan agency with the mandate to oversee the enforcement of cam-
paign finance law.32  
 In 1976, only two years after the passage of the amended version 
of the Act, the constitutionality of FECA was challenged in Buckley v. 
Valeo on both First Amendment and equal protection grounds.33  The 
Buckley decision by the Supreme Court established several critical 
precedents with lasting impact in the area of campaign finance law.  
First, the Buckley Court held that the contribution of money to, and 
expenditure of money on, political campaigns is speech, not conduct, 
rejecting the holding of the Court of Appeals below.34  By regulating 
campaign spending, the contribution and expenditure limits at issue 
raised First Amendment concerns:  “The Act’s contribution and ex-
penditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental 
First Amendment activities.  Discussion of public issues and debate on 
the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the 
system of government established by our Constitution.”35 
B. Expenditure Limits 
The Court then proceeded to discuss what level of scrutiny the 
expenditure and contribution limits should be subject to.  Here, the 
Court drew a distinction between the two types of restrictions.  Ex-
penditure limitations place a “substantial” restriction on political 
speech.36  This is because, as the Court recognized, communicating 
information in society via any medium almost invariably requires the 
spending of money.37  A restriction on expenditures therefore limits 
the amount of discussion on political issues and the “size of the au-
dience reached.”38  Here, the expenditure limit of $1000 on indepen-
dent expenditures would prevent the use of the most “effective” 
forms of communication by those seeking to make such expendi-
 
 31 Public Funding of Presidential Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Aug. 1996), http://www.
fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml (explaining that the presidential public financ-
ing system was expanded to include funding for primary elections and nominating con-
ventions). 
 32 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7. 
 33 Id. at 11. 
 34 Id. at 16. 
 35 Id. at 14. 
 36 Id. at 39. 
 37 Id. at 19. 
 38 Id. 
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tures, while the expenditure limit on campaigns would force candi-
dates to spend less than they could raise.39  Furthermore, the limita-
tion on personal expenditures by candidates imposed a “substantial 
restraint” on the candidate’s ability to engage in free speech.40  Can-
didates must be able to spend their own money without restriction to 
communicate their views on political issues to members of the public, 
who can then decide on which candidate for whom to vote.41  There-
fore, the Court found that because the expenditure limits struck at 
the heart of political speech, they would need to be justified by a gov-
ernment interest that could satisfy “exacting scrutiny.”42 
C. Contribution Limits 
Contribution limits, on the other hand, do not place as significant 
a burden on First Amendment rights as expenditure limits and there-
fore deserve a lower level of scrutiny.43  When an individual makes a 
campaign contribution, he is expressing his support for the candidate 
and the candidate’s views.44  But this expression of support consists of 
a “symbolic act” that is not dependent on the size of the contribu-
tion.45  A contribution limit still allows for the symbolic expression of 
support by the contributor;46 thus, such limits, unlike expenditure 
limits, only place a “marginal restriction” on the contributor’s 
speech.47  Of course, contribution limitations could be so low as to re-
strict the overall amount of political speech, but the Court found no 
evidence that the limits at issue would have such an effect.48  Instead, 
candidates would have to seek money from a larger number of con-
tributors; contributors who gave the maximum amount allowed to a 
particular candidate could also continue to spend money on direct 
 
 39 Id. at 19–20. 
 40 Id. at 52. 
 41 Id. at 52–53. 
 42 Id. at 44–45 (referring specifically to the level of scrutiny applicable to the independent 
expenditure limitation).  In practice, Buckley’s call for “exacting scrutiny” has led the Su-
preme Court to apply strict scrutiny to expenditure limitations.  See Citizens United v. 
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (explaining that a corporate expenditure ban is subject to 
strict scrutiny) (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)); Davis v. 
FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 (2008) (applying strict scrutiny to a statutory scheme burdening 
personal expenditures) (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 
(1986)). 
 43 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20. 
 44 Id. at 21. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 20. 
 48 Id. at 21. 
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political expression in support of the candidate.49  Therefore, contri-
bution limits need only satisfy an intermediate level of scrutiny:  They 
must be “closely drawn” and justified by a “sufficiently important in-
terest.”50 
D. State Interests Under Heightened Scrutiny:  Preventing Corruption is 
Legitimate, Equalizing Speech is Not 
The Court then went on to look at the two types of limits under 
the respective standards of scrutiny it had outlined.  First, the Court 
found that the contribution limits could be justified by the state in-
terest in preventing political corruption or its appearance.51  An effec-
tive political campaign requires large sums of money, and a candidate 
without extraordinary wealth must rely on others to raise this mon-
ey.52  Thus, if a candidate were allowed to take in large contributions 
from individual contributors, there would be a danger such contribu-
tions would be “given to secure a political quid pro quo from current 
and potential office holders, [undermining] the integrity of our sys-
tem of representative democracy.”53  Even if large contributions did 
not secure such political favoritism, there was just as great a danger 
that the public would believe improper influence was being exerted, 
undermining public confidence in the electoral system.54  Therefore, 
the contribution limits struck the appropriate balance of addressing 
the threat of corruption or its appearance posed by large campaign 
contributions, while not significantly undermining political dialo-
gue.55 
As for the expenditure limitations, the Court found these could 
not be justified by the state’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance.56  The $1000 limitation on independent expenditures 
did not serve the anticorruption interest because such expenditures 
were not coordinated with the candidate and did not raise the risk of 
improper arrangements between the candidate and the individual or 
group making the expenditure.57  Furthermore, the Court rejected 
the state’s other asserted interest:  “[E]qualizing the relative ability of 
 
 49 Id. at 22. 
 50 Id. at 25. 
 51 Id. at 26, 38. 
 52 Id. at 26. 
 53 Id. at 26–27. 
 54 Id. at 27. 
 55 Id. at 28–29 
 56 Id. at 45, 53, 56. 
 57 Id. at 47. 
May 2011] TRIGGER FUNDING PROVISIONS 1149 
 
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.”58  As 
the Court explained, “the concept that the government may restrict 
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, 
which was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of in-
formation from diverse and antagonistic sources.”59  Similarly, the 
Court rejected the limit on a candidate’s personal expenditures.60  
Such a limit actually increased a candidate’s dependence on poten-
tially corrupting campaign contributions, and the equalizing interest 
was also unavailing because the First Amendment mandates that a 
candidate have the opportunity for unlimited speech on behalf of his 
candidacy.61  Finally, the Court rejected the overall expenditure limit 
as not justified by either the anticorruption or equalizing interest.62  
The proper means to restrict a campaign’s dependence on large con-
tributions was through contribution limitations, not expenditure li-
mitations.63 
E. The Presidential Public Financing System 
Buckley also upheld the presidential public financing system under 
the First Amendment.64  Recognizing that Congress has the power to 
spend money to promote the general welfare under the Constitu-
tion,65 the Court found that the public financing of elections “furth-
ers” the First Amendment66:  “[The system] is a congressional effort, 
not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public 
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in 
the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.”67  The 
Court found analogies to the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment to be inapposite.68  While the government may not aid 
one religion at the expense of others under the Establishment 
Clause, the goal of the Speech Clause is in fact to increase public de-
bate.69  Thus, the government may provide financial assistance for the 
 
 58 Id. at 48. 
 59 Id. at 48–49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60 Id. at 54. 
 61 Id. at 53–54. 
 62 Id. at 55, 56. 
 63 Id. at 55. 
 64 Id. at 92–93. 
 65 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 66 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93. 
 67 Id. at 92–93. 
 68 Id. at 92. 
 69 Id. at 92–93, 93 n.127. 
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exercise of free speech under the Speech and Press Clauses—and the 
“statute books are replete” with such laws.70  Furthermore, the financ-
ing system serves a significant governmental interest in preventing 
corruption by “eliminating the improper influence of large private 
contributions.”71  In addition, the Court noted that while expenditure 
limitations were unconstitutional as applied to privately financed 
candidates, such limitations could be constitutional as applied to 
candidates opting for public financing, so long as the choice to enroll 
in public financing remained voluntary:  “Just as a candidate may vo-
luntarily limit the size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he 
may decide to forgo private fundraising and accept public funding.”72 
In Republican National Committee, the district court upheld the pres-
idential election financing system from further constitutional chal-
lenge.73  As the RNC court explained, a candidate makes a strategic 
choice whether to participate in public funding and submit to ex-
penditure limitations, presumably doing so only if public funding 
would “enhance” his ability to communicate with the electorate.74  
There is nothing coercive about such a scheme:  “[A]s long as the 
candidate remains free to engage in unlimited private funding and 
spending instead of limited public funding, the law does not violate 
the First Amendment rights of the candidate or supporters.”75  Fur-
thermore, the expenditure limits were justified because they were 
part of a public financing system that served the government’s com-
pelling interest in preventing corruption stemming from large cam-
paign contributions.76  If the candidate could opt for public funding 
and still expend unlimited private funds, the system would fail to 
serve the purpose of eliminating a candidate’s dependence on private 
contributions.77  RNC was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court 
without opinion.78 
 
 70 Id. at 93 n.127. 
 71 Id. at 96. 
 72 Id. at 57 n.65. 
 73 Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d mem., 445 U.S. 
955 (1980). 
 74 Id. at 285. 
 75 Id. at 284. 
 76 Id. at 285. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (mem.). 
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II.  THE LOWER COURT CASE LAW ON TRIGGER FUNDING PROVISIONS 
A. The Rise of Trigger Funding Provisions 
Following Buckley’s pronouncement of public financing systems as 
constitutional, states began to put in place their own public financing 
systems for state elections.79  Currently, sixteen states offer some form 
of public financing.80  The Buckley decision, however, had a profound 
impact on the way such systems could be structured.  Because Buckley 
held that privately financed candidates could not be subject to cam-
paign expenditure limitations, several states have included trigger 
provisions in their public financing systems to ensure that participat-
ing candidates can remain competitive when running against a high-
spending opponent.81  Without such provisions, candidates would be 
hesitant to participate in public financing because a non-participating 
candidate could drown out the participating candidate’s message by 
spending potentially unlimited funds.82 
Trigger funding typically consists of the distribution of a subsidy 
to a participating candidate when his opponent’s spending (or inde-
pendent expenditures on his opponent’s behalf or against him) 
crosses a certain threshold.83  It may also involve the removal of cer-
 
 79 Crosland, supra note 26, at 1278. 
 80 R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIC FINANCING OF CONGRESSIONAL 
CAMPAIGNS:  OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 32 (2010) (referring to states providing public fi-
nancing directly to a participating candidate’s campaign). 
 81 See discussion infra notes 86–87 (listing states with trigger provisions).  Trigger funding 
usually make up a part of state public financing systems that have been referred to as 
“Clean Elections” schemes.  See Crosland, supra note 26, at 1279. 
 82 See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Ariz. 
Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club Pac v. Bennett, No. 10–238, 2010 WL 4163753 (U.S. 
Nov. 29, 2010) (explaining that in Arizona without trigger funding “it would be too easy 
to outspend the [participating] candidate and no one would run as a . . . [publicly fi-
nanced] candidate”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Emily C. Schuman, 
Davis v. Federal Election Commission:  Muddying the Clean Money Landscape, 42 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 737, 740 (2009) (“The trigger mechanism is one component that is not only at-
tractive but necessary . . . .  Without designated triggers” few, if any, candidates would 
choose to participate.); Hasen, supra note 24 (“[R]ational politicians . . . will not opt into 
the public financing plan unless they think they will be able to run a competitive cam-
paign under the public financing system.  The whole point of the extra matching 
funds . . . is to give candidates assurance they won’t be vastly outspent in their election.”). 
 83 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952 (2003) (distributing trigger funding when non-
participating candidate’s spending and independent expenditures in favor of non-
participating candidate or against participating candidate surpasses spending limit faced 
by participating candidate); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.67 (2010) (providing trigger 
funding when non-participating candidate’s spending, plus independent expenditures 
against participating candidate or for non-participating candidate, exceeds certain spend-
ing levels). 
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tain expenditure and private contribution limits that the participat-
ing candidate was originally subject to.84  Rescue provisions may offer 
unlimited funds to a participating candidate or they may cap the 
maximum distribution of funds to a participating candidate.85  Three 
states have or until recently had trigger provisions for the public fi-
nancing of campaigns for all statewide and legislative offices:  Arizo-
na, Maine, and Connecticut.86  Several other states have or until re-
cently had trigger provisions for the public financing of campaigns 
for certain political offices.87 
B. Challenges to the Constitutionality of Trigger Funding Provisions 
Opponents of rescue funding have argued that the provisions vi-
olate the First Amendment.  They claim that a non-participating can-
didate’s speech will be chilled if he knows that his spending will trig-
ger the distribution of a subsidy to his opponent’s campaign.88  
However, several courts have considered the constitutionality of res-
cue funding under the First Amendment, and until recently, only one 
court, the Eighth Circuit in Day v. Holahan,89 found trigger funding 
unconstitutional.  
 
 84 See Kenneth N. Weine, Triggering The First Amendment:  Why Campaign Finance Systems that 
Include “Triggers” are Constitutional, 24 J. LEGIS. 223, 227–28 (1998) (discussing the possible 
configurations of trigger provisions). 
 85 Compare Daggett v. Comm’n on Govern. Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 451 
(1st Cir. 2000) (analyzing a scheme offering matching funds capped at two times the ini-
tial distribution), with Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998) (examining a provi-
sion offering unlimited matching funds for private contributions). 
 86 The public financing systems for these states can be found at:  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
16–940 to 16–961 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9–700 to 9–751 (2009) (§§ 9–713 to 9–
714, invalidated by Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010), petition 
for cert. filed sub nom. Green Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 2010 WL 5126519 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2010) 
(No. 10-795) and repealed 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21–A §§ 1121 to 1128 (2008). 
 87 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§106.30 to 106.36 (2009) (public financing scheme with trigger fund-
ing for governor elections), § 106.355 invalidated by Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1298 
(11th Cir. 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 163-278.61 to 163-278.70 (2010) (public financ-
ing scheme with trigger funding for judicial elections); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19A-1 to 1-
19A-17 (2010) (public financing scheme with trigger funding for statewide judicial elec-
tions and public regulation commissioner); W. VA. CODE §§ 3-12-1 to 3-12-17 (2010) (pi-
lot public financing system with trigger funding for certain judicial elections); WIS. STAT. 
§§ 11.500 to 11.522 (2010) (public financing system with trigger funding for judicial elec-
tions). 
 88 See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 
F.3d 427, 437 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The plaintiffs argue that their political speech is chilled 
because spending in excess of the specified trigger results in public funds being disbursed 
to a participating candidate whom the plaintiffs do not support.”). 
 89 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994).  For a thorough discussion of the case and its back-
ground, see Adam S. Tanenbaum, Comment, Day v. Holahan:  Crossroads in Campaign 
Finance Jurisprudence, 84 GEO. L.J. 151 (1995). 
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1. Eighth Circuit 
The Minnesota rescue funding provision considered by the Eighth 
Circuit in Day was triggered when an independent expenditure was 
made against a participating candidate.90  The provision provided the 
participating candidate with a subsidy equal to one-half the amount 
of the independent expenditure and raised the participating candi-
date’s expenditure limit by the amount of the expenditure.91  Accord-
ing to the court, the result of such a scheme was that the individual 
making an independent expenditure in opposition to a participating 
candidate “bec[a]me[] directly responsible” for increasing the fund-
ing available to the participating candidate.92  Armed with this “know-
ledge,” individuals seeking to make an independent expenditure in 
opposition to a participating candidate would be chilled from doing 
so.93  Such “self-censorship” was no less “susceptible to constitutional 
challenge than is direct government censorship.”94 
The court then proceeded to analyze whether the scheme could 
be justified as narrowly tailored and in service of a compelling state 
interest.95  The state argued that the provision served the interest of 
encouraging participation in the public financing system, which in 
turn increased public confidence in the electoral system.96  The court 
said it was not certain this interest could ever be “sufficiently compel-
ling” to justify the provision at issue, but in any event, participation in 
the state’s public financing system was already close to 100%, and so 
the provision was unnecessary to encourage participation.97  Thus, the 
provision was not justified by a compelling state interest and was in 
violation of the First Amendment.98 
Despite its holding in Day, the Eighth Circuit seemed to revisit its 
own decision in Rosenstiel.99  The Rosenstiel case concerned a Minneso-
ta provision which lifted an expenditure limitation on a participating 
candidate after his non-participating opponent crossed certain ex-
penditure or contribution thresholds.100  Seemingly ignoring the ra-
 
 90 Day, 34 F.3d at 1359–60. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 1360. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
 95 Day, 34 F.3d at 1361. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98 Id. at 1362. 
 99 Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996). 
100 Id. at 1547. 
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tionale of Day, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the rescue provision—in 
this case, solely the lifting of the expenditure ceiling—under a test of 
coerciveness.101  The court found that the expenditure limitation and 
initial public subsidy to a participating candidate were merely incen-
tives to participate in the program and were not “inherently penal” 
vis-à-vis non-participating candidates.102  The scheme simply offered 
candidates another choice for financing their campaigns, and a ra-
tional candidate would decide whether accepting public funding—
with its attendant burdens and benefits—made the most sense for his 
campaign.103  Therefore, the court found that the provision “pro-
motes, rather than detracts from, cherished First Amendment values” 
and was not coercive.104 
However, the dissent argued that the waiver of the expenditure 
limitation under the scheme placed the same chill, if not a greater 
one, on the speech of a non-participating candidate as the additional 
subsidy at issue at Day:  A non-participating candidate would refrain 
from exceeding the spending limits so as to not trigger the waiver of 
the expenditure ceiling for the participating candidate.105  Further-
more, unlike in Day, the expenditure limit on the participating can-
didate here would be wholly removed, as opposed to being raised by 
the amount of the expenditure, as in Day.106  In the view of the dis-
sent, Day, therefore, would appear to compel the opposite conclusion 
as was reached in the case,107 an observation also made by other cir-
cuits in discounting Day.108 
2. First Circuit 
The Day court soon found its holding explicitly rejected in two 
other circuits.  In Daggett, the First Circuit considered the constitutio-
 
101 Id. at 1549–50. 
102 Id. at 1550. 
103 Id. at 1552. 
104 Id. at 1552–53. 
105 Id. at 1561–62 (Lay, J., dissenting). 
106 Id. at 1562 (Lay, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. 
108 See N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 
427, 438 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Day decision appears to be an anomaly even within the 
Eighth Circuit . . . .  Had the Eighth Circuit employed the Day analysis in the manner the 
plaintiffs seek to apply it here, the court would have concluded that the provision created 
a danger of self-censorship.”); Daggett v. Comm’n on Govern. Ethics & Election Practices, 
205 F.3d 445, 464 n.25 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he logic of . . . [Rosenstiel and Day] is some-
what inconsistent . . . .  We . . . agree that the continuing vitality of Day is open to ques-
tion.”). 
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nality of Maine’s trigger funding provision.109  The provision at issue 
provided an additional subsidy to a participating candidate equal to 
the amount received by his opponent once the opponent raised more 
than the amount of the initial subsidy provided to the participating 
candidate.110  Rescue funding was also provided to a participating 
candidate when an independent expenditure was made advocating 
the participating candidate’s defeat or the non-participating candi-
date’s election.111  However, the amount of rescue funds that could be 
provided to the participating candidate was capped at two times the 
initial distribution.112 
As the Daggett court explained, those challenging the scheme mi-
sunderstood the nature of their First Amendment right.113  The provi-
sion at issue did not indirectly burden their speech because there is 
no right under the First Amendment to “speak free from response.”114  
Citing Buckley, the court explained that “the purpose of the First 
Amendment is [instead] to ‘secure the widest possible dissemination 
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.’”115  The 
scheme placed no restriction on the amount of speech that those op-
posing the participating candidate could make, and the speaker 
would not suffer a penalty for exercising his speech rights.116  The flaw 
of Day’s reasoning, the court said, was that it “equates responsive 
speech with an impairment to the initial speaker.”117  Furthermore, 
the provision could not be characterized as penalizing non-
participating candidates by providing an “exceptional benefit” to par-
ticipating candidates.118  The scheme provided participating candi-
dates with matching funds only up to two times the initial disburse-
ment, after which a non-participating candidate could “outraise and 
outspend her participating opponent with abandon.”119  Thus, the 
provision at issue did not violate the First Amendment.120 
 
109 Daggett, 205 F.3d at 450. 
110 Id. at 451. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 464. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam)). 
116 Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464. 
117 Id. at 465. 
118 Id. at 468. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 472. 
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3. Fourth Circuit 
In N.C. Right to Life, the Fourth Circuit considered the constitu-
tionality of the rescue provision in North Carolina’s public financing 
system for judicial elections.121  The relevant provision offered a par-
ticipating candidate an additional disbursement when the total 
amount of expenditures by his non-participating opponent (which 
included independent expenditures against the participating candi-
date or in support of the opponent’s candidacy) crossed a threshold 
amount, but the maximum additional disbursement was capped at 
two times the trigger amount.122  The Right to Life court found that the 
provision did not violate the free speech rights of non-participating 
candidates or those making relevant independent expenditures.123  
Again citing Buckley, the court explained that the distribution of 
matching funds enlarges public discussion, and in so doing, furthers 
“First Amendment values.”124  Rejecting Day, the court explained that 
the case’s “key flaw is that it equates the potential for self-censorship 
created by a matching funds scheme with ‘direct government censor-
ship.’”125  As the Right to Life court noted, Day supported its decision 
by citing to City of Lakewood, a Supreme Court case which dealt with 
the potential of direct government censorship.126  In Lakewood, the 
Court found that individuals might chill their speech out of fear that 
a local ordinance containing a vague licensing standard for newsracks 
would be misused by the mayor to deny newsrack permits to publish-
ers who criticized him.127  By contrast, non-participating candidates in 
North Carolina who choose not to trigger the rescue provisions do so 
as a result of a “strategic, political choice, not from a threat of gov-
ernment censure or prosecution.”128 
 
121 N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 
436 (4th Cir. 2008). 
122 Id. at 433.  During the primary, the “trigger amount” consists of sixty times the filing fee 
for the office the candidate seeks.  Id.  During the general election, the “trigger amount” 
equals the initial general election subsidy.  Id. 
123 Id. at 438. 
124 Id. at 437 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976) (per curiam) (internal qu-
otations marks omitted)). 
125 Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 438 (quoting Day v. Holahan, 34 F. 3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 
1994)). 
126 Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 438.   
127 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770, 772 (1988). 
128 Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 438. 
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4. Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit analyzed a trigger provision for Kentucky state 
elections in Gable v. Patton.129  The provision at issue was triggered af-
ter an opponent raised more than the expenditure limit on a partici-
pating candidate.130  Once triggered, the participating candidate’s 
expenditure limit was lifted; he could raise an unlimited amount of 
funds, which would be matched two to one by the state.131  Discussing 
Rosenstiel but failing to even mention Day, the court considered 
whether the matching fund scheme was unconstitutionally coercive, 
such that candidates had no choice but to participate.132  The court 
found that while “participation will be the rational choice in the large 
majority of cases,” this was merely the result of incentives offered by 
the matching funds provision, which did not rise to the level of un-
constitutional coercion.133 
C. Summary of the Circuit Conflict on Rescue Funding Pre-Davis 
The state of the circuit court decisions on trigger funding prior to 
Davis can be summarized as follows.  In the Eighth Circuit, the Day 
court equated the potential for self-censorship by a non-participating 
candidate in a matching funds scheme with a chill on speech.134  But 
both the Fourth Circuit in Right to Life and the First Circuit in Daggett 
explicitly rejected Day and its characterization of trigger funding as a 
chill on speech.135  Instead, both courts agreed that non-participating 
candidates have “[no] right to speak free from response.”136  Fur-
thermore, in Rosenstiel, the Eighth Circuit undermined its own hold-
ing in Day, ruling that a trigger provision waiving an expenditure li-
mitation for a participating candidate did not penalize a non-
participating candidate’s speech.137  The Sixth Circuit in Gable found 
that the incentives offered by trigger funding were not so overwhelm-
ing as to coerce participation by all candidates.138  Thus, the Eighth 
 
129 142 F.3d 940, 947 (6th Cir. 1998). 
130 Id. at 944. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 948–49. 
133 Id. at 949. 
134 Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994). 
135 Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 438; Daggett v. Comm’n on Govern. Ethics & Election Practices, 
205 F.3d 445, 465 (1st Cir. 2000). 
136 Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 439 (quoting Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
137 Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1552–53 (8th Cir. 1996). 
138 Gable, 142 F.3d at 949. 
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Circuit’s ruling in Day was the only circuit court decision to have 
found trigger provisions unconstitutional. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT RULES IN DAVIS V. FEC 
A. Jack Davis Challenges the “Millionaire’s Amendment” 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC,139 the law 
on trigger funding was effectively settled.  Only the Eighth Circuit’s 
outlying decision in Day, itself later undermined by Rosenstiel, had 
found rescue funding to be unconstitutional.140  However, the Davis 
decision, in one fell swoop, seriously called into question the existing 
case law on matching funding provisions.141  Davis did not involve 
public campaign financing.  Instead, it concerned a challenge to the 
“Millionaire’s Amendment” of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 2002.142  The Millionaire’s Amendment took effect when a candi-
date for Congress faced an opponent who had chosen to self-finance 
his campaign, which was defined as spending over $350,000 of his 
personal funds on his campaign (as well as certain other types of fun-
draising).143  Under the scheme, a candidate had his contribution lim-
its relaxed when faced by a self-financing opponent.144  Most impor-
tantly, he could receive contributions at three times the normal limit 
per donor.145  He could also receive contributions from individuals 
whose yearly election contributions had reached the aggregate lim-
it.146  The self-financing candidate, however, still faced the usual limits 
on contributions.147  In other words, a self-financing candidate’s con-
tribution limits were not raised. 
The scheme was challenged by Jack Davis, a Democrat who had 
run an unsuccessful self-financed campaign for Congress in New York 
in 2004.148  Running again in 2006 as a self-financing candidate, Davis 
filed suit, challenging the Millionaire’s Amendment on First 
Amendment and equal protection grounds.149  Davis argued that the 
scheme penalized his First Amendment right to unlimited personal 
 
139 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
140 Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1362 (1994). 
141 See discussion infra Part V. 
142 Davis, 554 U.S. at 728. 
143 Id. at 728 & n.4. 




148 Id. at 731.   
149 Id. at 744 n.9. 
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campaign expenditures because by self-financing his campaign 
beyond a certain limit, he was triggering a scheme that would enable 
his opponent to raise more money.150  The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia ruled against Davis,151 and he ap-
pealed directly to the Supreme Court, which was the exclusive avenue 
for appellate review under the statute.152 
B. The Supreme Court Opinion 
The Davis Court began by explaining that if the provision had 
simply triggered an increase in the contribution limits for all candi-
dates, the provision would be constitutional.153  The Court explained 
that under Buckley, Congress can restrict contribution limits provided 
they satisfy intermediate scrutiny, but it need not do so; thus a relaxa-
tion of limits across the board would clearly be constitutional.154  
However, as the Court explained, “We have never upheld the consti-
tutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits for can-
didates who are competing against each other.”155  While the provi-
sion did not directly limit personal expenditures on campaign 
speech, which Buckley prohibited,156 it “impose[d] an unprecedented 
penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amend-
ment right.”157  As the Court said, the Millionaire’s Amendment “re-
quires a candidate to choose between the First Amendment right to 
engage in unfettered political speech and subjection to discriminato-
ry fundraising limitations.”158  Here, the Court cited Day for the prop-
osition that candidates self-financing under the provision bear a bur-
den if they choose to speak and activate the scheme of discriminatory 
contribution limits.159 
The Court went further, distinguishing the provision at issue from 
the public financing system upheld in Buckley.160  The scheme in Buck-
ley offered participating candidates the opportunity to accept public 
funding in exchange for abiding by expenditure limits.161  However, a 
 
150 Id. at 736. 
151 Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2007). 
152 Davis, 554 U.S. at 732. 
153 Id. at 737. 
154 Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–35, 38, 46–47, & 47 n.53 (per curiam)). 
155 Davis, 554 U.S at 738. 
156 Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52–53). 
157 Davis, 554 U.S at 738. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 739 (citing Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359–60 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
160 Davis, 554 U.S at 739. 
161 Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65). 
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non-participating candidate “retain[ed] the unfettered right to make 
unlimited personal expenditures.”162  The Millionaire’s Amendment 
did not allow such an “unfettered right” because a candidate’s per-
sonal expenditures triggered a “scheme of discriminatory contribu-
tion limits.”163  Therefore, the scheme was not “remotely parallel to 
that in Buckley.”164 
The provision not only burdened Jack Davis’s speech, but it could 
not be justified by a compelling state interest.165  As Buckley held, re-
liance on personal campaign expenditures reduces the likelihood of 
corruption, and so the provision did not further the state’s interest in 
preventing corruption or its appearance.166  The government’s other 
asserted interest—to “level electoral opportunities for candidates of 
different personal wealth”—was, in effect, the same equalization in-
terest that the Buckley Court rejected as inadequate to justify the pro-
vision.167  Therefore, since the scheme burdened the First Amend-
ment right of a self-financing candidate and could not be justified by 
a compelling state interest, the Court found by a 5–4 vote that the 
provision was unconstitutional.168 
IV.  THE LOWER COURT CASE LAW ON TRIGGER FUNDING PROVISIONS 
AFTER DAVIS 
A. Post-Davis, Challenges to Trigger Funding  Provisions Begin Anew 
While Davis was not a public financing case, its rationale has be-
gun to be deployed to strike down matching funds provisions as un-
constitutional.  Two circuit courts have viewed rescue funding as pro-
viding a non-participating candidate with the same choice as that 
faced by a self-financing candidate in Davis:  Abide by self-imposed 
expenditure limits or suffer a burden on campaign speech through 
the distribution of rescue funding to an opponent.169  Commentators 
 
162 Davis, 554 U.S at 739–40. 
163 Id. at 740. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 744. 
167 Id. at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56–57 
(1976) (per curiam)). 
168 Davis, 554 U.S at 744. 
169 See Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding Florida trigger pro-
vision unconstitutional on motion for preliminary injunction); Green Party of Conn. v. 
Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Green Party of 
Conn. v. Lenge, 2010 WL 5126519 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2010) (No. 10-795) (finding Connecticut 
trigger provision unconstitutional). 
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have reached conclusions similar to those of the lower courts.170  As 
one proclaims: 
Viewed through the lens of Davis, it is clear that the rescue funds provi-
sion burdens First Amendment rights.  As in Davis, the rescue funds pro-
vision presents candidates with a stark choice:  “[A]bide by a limit on 
personal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that right” 
by the provision of rescue funds.”171 
The Ninth Circuit, however, found trigger provisions constitu-
tional in McComish v. Bennett,172 but its ruling will be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court,173  which initially stayed the decision (and reinstated 
the lower court’s injunction against enforcement of the trigger provi-
sions) pending a petition for certiorari.174  This stands in stark con-
trast to the Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for certiorari in Right 
to Life in the aftermath of Davis, leaving standing the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision that rescue funding was constitutional.175  In Respect Maine 
PAC v. McKee, the Supreme Court refused to grant a request for an 
emergency writ of injunction enjoining enforcement of Maine’s trig-
ger provisions late into the 2010 election cycle after the First Circuit 
similarly refused to grant a preliminary injunction.176  But in this case 
 
170 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Davis v. FEC:  The Roberts Court’s Continuing Attack on Campaign 
Finance Reform, 44 TULSA L. REV. 475, 493 (2009) (“Davis indicates that [the old] way of 
thinking about First Amendment burdens is no longer good campaign finance law.”); 
Crosland, supra note 26, at 1309 (concluding that rescue funding is unconstitutional); Ri-
chard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 283, 321–22 (2010) (“[Davis] suggests that aiding the opposition is a burden on 
protected speech . . . .  If that is so, asymmetrical schemes of public financing that provide 
additional funding . . . in response to independent expenditures are presumably uncons-
titutional.”); Schuman, supra note 82, at 741 (arguing that Davis “suggests that triggers 
are unconstitutional”). 
171 James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not To Reform Judicial Elections:  Davis, White, and the 
Future of Judicial Campaign Financing, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 195, 214 (2008) (quoting Davis, 
554 U.S. at 740). 
172 611 F.3d 510, 527 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 644 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010) (No. 
10-239). 
173 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010) (mem.); 
McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010) (mem.).  The plaintiffs in McComish included 
a group of original plaintiffs and a group of intervening plaintiffs who joined the case at 
the district court level in fall 2008.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner’s Brief I 
at 12–15, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 2010 WL 3267528 (U.S. 
Aug. 17, 2010) (No. 10–238) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief I] (discussing procedural his-
tory of case).  Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to each group of plaintiffs sep-
arately, but the cases will be consolidated and heard together.  See McComish, 131 S. Ct. at 
644.
174 McComish v. Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 3408 (2010) (mem.). 
175 N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied by  Duke v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (mem.).   
176 Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2010), injunction denied by 131 S. Ct. 
445 (2010) (mem.). 
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the First Circuit may review its decision in Daggett,177 with the outcome 
likely to depend on McComish. 
B.  The New Circuit Court Conflict on Trigger Funding Provisions 
1.  Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit took up a Davis-based attack on Connecticut’s 
trigger provisions in Green Party v. Garfield.  The complex provision at 
issue provided that a participating candidate would receive an addi-
tional subsidy when a non-participating candidate’s spending ex-
ceeded the participating candidate’s expenditure limit, which was 
capped at an amount equal to the initial public subsidy plus a small 
amount of contributor funds.178  Specifically, the trigger funding was 
to be in the amount of 25% of the initial grant and could be distri-
buted a maximum of four times:  When the non-participating candi-
date spent either 100%, 125%, 150%, or 175% of the participating 
candidate’s expenditure limit.179  A participating candidate would also 
receive rescue funding in the amount by which independent expend-
itures against his candidacy, combined with the spending of non-
participating candidates, exceeded the size of the initial grant.180 
At the district court level, the court overturned its previous find-
ing that rescue funding was constitutional in the wake of Davis,181 re-
marking that “Davis has breathed new life into the legal reasoning of 
Day.”182  The Second Circuit reaffirmed the finding of the lower court 
that, like in Davis, under a matching funds scheme a non-
participating candidate fails to retain the right to unfettered cam-
paign speech.183  The court noted that the penalty in Davis (the impo-
sition of an asymmetrical regulatory scheme) was different than the 
penalty at issue in this case (the distribution of an additional subsidy 
 
177 Respect Maine PAC, 622 F.3d at 15 (“[T]he issues raised by the challenges to Maine’s laws 
are difficult and will require careful analysis, on a fully developed record.  Given these 
difficulties, we cannot forecast what our ultimate judgment on the merits will be.”). 
178 Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d 298, 364 (D. Conn. 2010), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 365. 
181 Id. at 370. 
182 Id. at 372. 
183 Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 245 (2d Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed sub 
nom. Green Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 2010 WL 5126519 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2010) (No. 10-795).  
The court also found that the provision was unconstitutional when triggered by indepen-
dent expenditures.  Id. at 246. 
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to a participating candidate).184  But the court found that the penalty 
here was “harsher” than that in Davis because in the latter case a can-
didate facing relaxed contribution limits might not be able to raise 
additional funding, while a participating candidate will undoubtedly 
receive additional money.185  Such a burden on speech could not be 
justified by a compelling state interest in preventing corruption be-
cause, according to the court, a burden on the expenditure of per-
sonal funds can never be justified in preventing corruption under 
Davis.186  Thus, the provision was unconstitutional.187 
2.  Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit considered Florida’s rescue funding provi-
sion in Scott v. Roberts.  Florida’s system provided that a participating 
candidate received a fully matching subsidy for any spending by a 
non-participating candidate that exceeded the statutory expenditure 
limit.188  Participating candidates were also eligible to receive private 
contributions which the state would match on a two-to-one (for the 
first $150,000 in contributions) or a one-to-one basis up until the sta-
tutory expenditure limit was reached.189  The challenge was brought 
by Rick Scott, a Republican running in the primary for governor in 
2010.190  Scott still intended to spend over the statutory expenditure 
limit of $24,901,170, but claimed that his speech was chilled for two 
reasons:  He would choose to exceed the expenditure limit later in 
the race to avoid providing his opponents with a “competitive advan-
tage” and spend less on his campaign than if the trigger provision did 
not exist.191 
The district court had found that the provision burdened Scott’s 
speech but could be justified by a compelling state interest in pre-
venting corruption, denying Scott’s motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion.192  However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.193  Citing Green Party, 
the court found that trigger funding was a “harsher” penalty than the 
 
184 Id. at 245. 
185 Id. at 244–45. 
186 Id. at 245. 
187 Id. 
188 Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2010). 
189 Id. at 1285–86. 
190 Id. at 1282. 
191 Id. at 1284 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
192 Id. at 1289. 
193 Id. at 1297. 
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activation of the asymmetrical regulatory system in Davis.194  To the 
court, Davis’s citation to Day supported the view that the salient fea-
ture of the scheme in Davis was its provision of a competitive advan-
tage to a candidate’s opponents, which trigger funding also offers.195 
The Florida scheme was also not justified by a compelling state in-
terest in preventing corruption.196  Here, the court asserted that given 
the strict contribution limitations already in place, expenditure limi-
tations on participating candidates did nothing to reduce corrup-
tion.197  Furthermore, even assuming the anticorruption interest was 
served by the system, it was not the least restrictive alternative, which 
is required under strict scrutiny; instead of providing rescue funding, 
the participating candidate could merely be released from an ex-
penditure limit, which was a step Scott did not contest.198  Thus, the 
court found Scott was entitled to an issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion blocking enforcement of the trigger provision.199 
3.  Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of Arizona’s 
rescue funding provision in McComish v. Bennett.200  The scheme, part 
of Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act, provided a participating 
candidate with an initial grant and subsequent matching funds in the 
amount by which a non-participating candidate’s speech, or inde-
pendent expenditures in support of the non-participating candidate, 
or in opposition to the participating candidate, exceeded the initial 
grant.201  The additional subsidies were capped at an amount equal to 
three times the initial subsidy.202  The challenge was brought by sever-
al candidates for state political offices in 2010 who did not opt for 
public funding, along with two political action committees which 
 
194 Id. at 1291 (citing Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 245 (2d Cir. 2010), peti-
tion for cert. filed sub nom. Green Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 2010 WL 5126519 (U.S. Dec. 9, 
2010) (No. 10-795)). 
195 Scott, 612 F.3d at 1291–92. 
196 Id. at 1293–94. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 1294. 
199 Id. at 1297. 
200 McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 644 (U.S. Nov. 
29, 2010) (No. 10-239).   
201 Id. at 516–17.  The matching funding is reduced by six percent, and by the amount of any 
funds raised by the non-participating candidate during the preprimary period.  Id. at 516 
n.5. 
202 Id. at 517. 
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conduct independent expenditures.203  The parties alleged that 
matching funding deterred or delayed them from spending money 
on campaign-related speech.204 
The district court found that the provision was unconstitutional,205 
equating the distribution of matching funds with the penalty at issue 
in Davis.206  The provision did not survive strict scrutiny because it 
placed a burden on the speech of self-financing, non-participating 
candidates, and Davis held that a burden on a self-financing candi-
date’s speech does not serve the anticorruption interest.207  Yet, the 
court noted the anomaly of finding the provision unconstitutional 
merely because of the “incremental nature of the awards,” stating that 
“[i]f the Act provided for a single lump sum award, instead of incre-
mental awards, the law would fall squarely within the regime blessed 
in Buckley and reaffirmed in Davis.”208 
The circuit court lifted the district court’s enjoinment of the pro-
vision,209 finding that “Davis is easily and properly distinguished from 
the case at bench.”210  Davis concerned the imposition of an asymme-
trical regulatory scheme on a self-financing candidate previously un-
der the same regulatory scheme as his opponent.211  A publicly fi-
nanced candidate, on the other hand, faces an entirely different 
regulatory scheme than his opponent, and Buckley found such diffe-
rential treatment to be constitutional.212  Day, furthermore, was dis-
tinguishable on its facts as a case for which matching funding served 
no legitimate purpose, and its citation in Davis did not “sub silentio” 
overturn existing trigger funding case law.213  Though it agreed with 
 
203 Id. 
204 Id.  However, it is far from clear that the plaintiffs’ speech was in fact deterred.  Id. at 523–
24 (“No Plaintiff, however, has pointed to any specific instance in which she or he has de-
clined a contribution or failed to make an expenditure for fear of triggering matching 
funds.  The record as a whole contradicts many of Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions that 
their speech has been chilled.”); see also id. at 517–19 (analyzing the plaintiffs’ conten-
tions in detail). 
205  McComish v. Brewer, No. CV–08–1550–PHX–ROS, 2010 WL 2292213, at *10 (D. Ariz. 
 Jan. 20, 2010), rev’d sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010). 
206 Id. at *18 & n.14. 
207 McComish, 2010 WL 2292213, at *9 (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740-741 (2008)). 
208 McComish, 2010 WL 2292213, at *8. 
209 McComish, 611 F.3d at 527. 
210 Id. at 521. 
211 Id. at 522 (citing Davis, 554 U.S. at 738). 
212 McComish, 611 F.3d at 522 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 97 (1976) (per curiam)). 
213 McComish, 611 F.3d at 523 n.9 (citing Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1361 (8th Cir. 
1994)).   
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Daggett that there exists “no right to speak free from response”214 un-
der the First Amendment, the court nonetheless proceeded to ana-
lyze the provision under intermediate scrutiny.215  This standard was 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Citizens United as the appropriate 
standard for provisions which pose only a minimal burden on speech, 
such as disclosure requirements, which theoretically may cause indi-
viduals to refrain from speaking.216 
Here, the trigger provision was constitutional under intermediate 
scrutiny217:  There was a “substantial relation” between the matching 
funds provision and a “sufficiently important government interest.”218  
The trigger provision served the anticorruption interest by encourag-
ing participation in the public financing system and thus preventing 
reliance on campaign contributions.219  The district court mistakenly 
looked at whether the provision reduced corruption among non-
participating candidates, which is irrelevant to determining whether 
corruption among participating candidates is reduced.220  Without 
trigger funding, candidates would not be willing to opt for public fi-
nancing, and “[a] . . . system with no participants does nothing to re-
duce the existence or appearance of quid pro quo corruption.”221  
Thus, the provision was constitutional.222  The concurrence found 
that trigger funding should not be subjected to heightened scrutiny 
because it placed no limit at all on a non-participating candidate’s 
speech, unlike the statute in Davis.223 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision lifting the injunction of the district 
court, however, was stayed on June 8, 2010, pending a petition for 
certiorari,224 which was granted on November 29, 2010.225 
 
 
214 McComish, 611 F.3d at 524 (quoting Daggett v. Comm’n on Govern. Ethics & Election 
Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464 (1st Cir. 2000)).   
215 McComish, 611 F.3d at 525. 
216 Id. at 524–25 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010); Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 64, 96). 
217 McComish, 611 F.3d at 525. 
218 Id. (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914). 
219 Id. at 525–26. 
220 Id. at 526. 
221 Id. at 527. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 527–28 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
224 McComish v. Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 3408 (2010) (mem.). 
225 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010) (mem.); 
  McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010) (mem.); see discussion supra note 173 (ex-
plaining why two cert petitions were filed). 
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V.  THE MCCOMISH COURT’S OPPORTUNITY TO SAVE TRIGGER FUNDING 
PROVISIONS AFTER DAVIS 
Though supporters of matching funding provisions undoubtedly 
face an uphill battle to prevail in McComish,226 the Supreme Court’s 
upcoming decision is far from certain.  The lower court opinions 
finding trigger funding unconstitutional, as well as the alarmist views 
of commentators, interpret Davis too broadly.  A closer analysis of 
Davis suggests that its holding is far narrower and provides the Court 
with an important opportunity to clarify the meaning of Davis and 
uphold the constitutionality of trigger provisions. 
A.  The Critical Distinction Between Penalties and Non-Subsidies 
1.  The FEC Brief and the Nature of the Speech Burden at Issue in Davis 
Davis did not hold that any time a positive consequence accrues to 
one candidate from his opponent’s actions, the opponent’s free 
speech is burdened.  The Davis Court was clear that had the Millio-
naire’s Amendment raised contribution limits for all candidates as a 
result of a self-financing candidate’s spending, the provision would 
have been constitutional.227  Yet, in such a case, the self-financing 
candidate’s spending would still have positively benefited his oppo-
nent by raising his opponent’s contribution limits along with his own.  
One commentator relies on the fact that the Davis Court cited the 
FEC’s brief to conclude that trigger funding is unconstitutional.228  
The FEC brief conceded that “[the provision] does impose some con-
sequences on a candidate’s choice to finance beyond certain 
amounts.”229  But, for reasons just discussed, it cannot be the case that 
any time a candidate simply faces “some consequences” as a result of 
his decision to spend money on campaign speech, his speech is pena-
 
226 Because the Supreme Court granted an injunction in McComish and Justices Scalia and 
  Alito would have granted an emergency injunction in Respect Maine PAC, at least a few of 
the members of the Court are likely to have decided trigger provisions are unconstitu-
tional.  See Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 131 S. Ct. 445 (2010) (mem.); McComish v. 
Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 3408 (2010) (mem.). 
227 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008) (quoting Brief for the Appellee at 29, Davis v. FEC, 
554 U.S. 724 (2008) (No. 07-320)). 
228 Crosland, supra note 26, at 1307.  Crosland also discusses the limited case law in the area 
of trigger funding, but our analysis and conclusions greatly differ; see also Petitioner’s 
Brief I, supra note 173, at 32 (citing to language from the FEC Brief in Davis to suggest 
that trigger funding is unconstitutional). 
229 Davis, 554 U.S. at 739 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 29, Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) 
(No. 07-320)). 
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lized.  Otherwise, the Davis Court’s example of a provision that would 
be presumptively constitutional—raising the contribution limits for 
all candidates as a result of a self-financing candidate’s spending—
would have to be found unconstitutional using this logic. 
Instead, the characteristic feature of the scheme at issue in Davis 
was the fact that it imposed an “unprecedented penalty” on a candi-
date who chose to self-finance his campaign.230  The Court was clear 
that this “unprecedented penalty,” elsewhere described as a “bur-
den,” was defined by a very specific feature:  “[T]he activation of a 
scheme of discriminatory contribution limits.”231  The Court was even 
more explicit regarding the nature of the burden when it noted that 
“the unprecedented step of imposing different contribution and 
coordinated party expenditure limits on candidates vying for the same 
seat is antithetical to the First Amendment.”232 
2. Situating Trigger Funding Within Supreme Court Precedent as a 
Permissible Government Subsidy, Not a Burden on Speech 
Unlike contribution or expenditure limits, which operate as a re-
striction, or penalty, on speech, rescue funding—as with public elec-
tion financing in general—is a subsidy to a participating candidate.233  
Buckley itself distinguished between expenditure and contribution 
limits on the one hand, which were restrictions on speech that 
needed to be justified under heightened scrutiny, and public cam-
paign financing which was an “effort, not to abridge, restrict, or cen-
sor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate . . . public dis-
cussion . . . in the electoral process.”234  The Supreme Court has 
without exception cited Buckley as an example of a permissible gov-
ernment subsidy to a participating candidate, not as a penalty on a 
 
230 Davis, 554 U.S. at 739. 
231 Id. at 740 (emphasis added). 
232 Id. at 744 (emphasis added); see also McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 527 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“The Arizona scheme does not manipulate the limits 
on private donors’ contributions according to whether a competing candidate is partici-
pating in the government funding scheme.  Had it done so, Davis would apply by analo-
gy.”); Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 18 (“Davis is properly understood as a case 
about the unconstitutionality of a particular type of penalty—an ‘asymmetrical’ and ‘dis-
criminatory’ contribution limit that treated similarly situated, privately funded candidates 
differently merely because of one’s personally funded expenditures.”). 
233 See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 375, 384 (2008) (“Pub-
lic funding is clearly a government subsidy, whereas contribution limits are clearly gov-
ernment restrictions.”). 
234 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976) (per curiam). 
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non-participating candidate.235  The use of trigger provisions is merely 
a fiscally responsible way to distribute such a subsidy—incrementally, 
rather than in one lump sum.236  Both the Daggett court and the 
McComish circuit court concurrence explicitly refused to apply heigh-
tened scrutiny to rescue funding because as subsidies they are differ-
ent in kind than contribution or expenditure limits.237 
Conflating restrictions on speech and government subsidies for 
speech through a misreading of Davis leads to, in the words of the 
McComish district court, an “illogical” result.238  It is also inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent distinguishing between the two. 
The Court’s distinction between government subsidies and gov-
ernment restrictions was elaborated in two abortion funding cases, 
Maher239 and Harris240.  As the Maher Court explained, “[t]here is a ba-
sic difference between direct state interference with a protected activ-
ity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with 
legislative policy.”241  Just as Buckley had held that it was constitutional 
to exclude certain candidates from receiving public campaign financ-
ing, it was constitutional for Connecticut to refuse to fund non-
medically necessary abortions for indigent women, because neither 
were unconstitutional restrictions on fundamental rights.242  Of 
 
235 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (referring to Buckley as a subsidy case); 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (noting that 
Buckley found campaign financing to be a subsidy); see also Michael Fitzpatrick, Rust Cor-
rodes:  The First Amendment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L. REV. 185, 203 (1992) 
(situating Buckley within the line of Supreme Court subsidy cases). 
236 See Weine, supra note 84, at 236 (“The difference between a trigger and the presidential 
financing system upheld in Buckley lies simply in how the public subsidy amount is de-
rived.”); cf. Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Duke v. Leake, at 
15 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2008) (No. 08–120), 2008 WL 4419422 (“[P]etitioners argue that their 
First Amendment rights are infringed merely because the [s]tate . . . provides funds to 
participating candidates incrementally rather than in one lump sum.”). 
237 See McComish, 611 F.3d at 528 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“Because the challenged 
scheme imposes no contribution or spending limits, it does not restrict speech at all, so I 
cannot see why heightened scrutiny would apply.”); Daggett v. Comm’n on Govern. Eth-
ics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that expenditure limit 
cases are inapplicable “because they involve direct monetary restrictions 
on . . . expenditures, which inherently burden such speech, while the Maine statute 
creates no direct restriction”); see also The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra 
note 233, at 384 (“Recognizing this crucial distinction between penalties and subsidies, 
circuit courts have refused to apply expenditure limit cases when assessing the constitu-
tionality of asymmetrical public funding schemes.”). 
238 McComish v. Brewer, No. CV–08–1550–PHX–ROS, 2010 WL 2292213, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 
20, 2010), rev’d sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010). 
239 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
240 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
241 Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 (1977). 
242 Id. at 474–75 & 475 n.9 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94–95 (1976) (per curiam)). 
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course, as the Maher Court said, “[t]he State may have made child-
birth a more attractive alternative [to abortion], thereby influencing 
the woman’s decision” but a woman who elects to have an abortion is 
“no[t] disadvantage[d]” because the denial of a subsidy places “no 
obstacles” in her way.243  In another abortion subsidy case, Harris, the 
Court explicitly rejected the notion that a denial of a subsidy was 
equivalent to a penalty:  “A refusal to fund protected activity, without 
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that 
activity.”244 
In its speech subsidy cases, the Court has maintained the non-
subsidy/penalty distinction by holding that the government has far 
more ability to discriminate when distributing a subsidy than when 
restricting speech.245  Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
selective government subsidies are presumptively constitutional un-
der the First Amendment (and therefore not a penalty on non-
recipients) when such subsidies are provided on a viewpoint-neutral 
basis, as in both Regan246 and Buckley.247  In Regan, a tax-exempt organi-
zation challenged a provision of the tax code denying tax-exempt sta-
tus to organizations which conducted lobbying activities, with the ex-
ception of veterans’ organizations.248  A tax exemption is the 
equivalent of a cash subsidy in the amount that the exempt taxpayer 
would have to pay on his taxes.249  As the Regan Court explained, 
 
243 Maher, 432 U.S at 474. 
244 Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19. 
245 See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 233, at 384 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s subsidy jurisprudence); see also discussion infra notes 246–60 and ac-
companying text. 
246 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983); see Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (“[W]e reaf-
firmed the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government’s provision of finan-
cial benefits [in Regan] . . . . Regan relied on a distinction based on preferential treatment 
of certain speakers—veterans’ organizations—and not a distinction based on the content 
or messages of those groups’ speech.”); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 450 (1991) 
(“Regan stands for the proposition that a tax scheme that discriminates among speakers 
does not implicate the First Amendment unless it discriminates on the basis of ideas.”); 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1986) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that the subsidy at issue in Regan was content–neutral); see also discussion in-
fra notes 270–77 and accompanying text (discussing Pacific Gas).  
247 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95 (1976) (per curiam); see Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 241 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to Buckley as a 
case involving constitutional viewpoint–neutral subsidies); Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 14–15 
(characterizing Buckley as a case concerning content–neutral subsidies); see also discussion 
infra note 259 (discussing the content–neutrality of rescue funding); discussion infra 
notes 270–77 and accompanying text (analyzing Pacific Gas). 
248 Regan, 461 U.S. at 545–46. 
249 Id. at 544. 
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Congress had decided that it would not use the tax code to subsidize 
lobbying by non-profit organizations (except for veterans’ organiza-
tions), but this did not violate the First Amendment:  “[A] legisla-
ture’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right 
does not infringe that right.”250  The Court pointed to Buckley in sup-
port of the proposition that it was constitutional for Congress to dis-
criminate in the distribution of subsidies:  Buckley found that Con-
gress could decide to subsidize candidates who participated in 
primaries, but not subsidize those who did not.251 
As the Regan Court explained, a discriminatory subsidy would be 
unconstitutional, however, if it were “aim[ed] at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas.”252  Government subsidies designed to “facilitate pri-
vate speech,”253 as in Velazquez, or to “encourage a diversity of views 
from private speakers,”254 as in Rosenberger, have been struck down on-
ly when they violate viewpoint-neutrality.255  Rosenberger involved a uni-
versity subsidy for student printing costs that was denied to a religious 
publication,256 while Velazquez concerned a statute denying subsidies 
for free legal assistance to organizations that sought to challenge wel-
fare law.257 
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s subsidy jurisprudence establishes 
that when distributing a subsidy such as rescue funding, the state may 
discriminate by providing such a subsidy only to a participating can-
didate.  As long as such a subsidy is distributed to a private speaker on 
a viewpoint-neutral basis,258 which is the case with rescue funding,259 it 
 
250 Id. at 549; see also id. at 550–51 (sustaining selective subsidy with respect to veterans’ or-
ganizations).  The Court went out of its way to explain that precedent involving a restric-
tive ordinance on speech was not relevant to the subsidy at issue in Regan.  Id. at 546 n.7 
(citing Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 
290, 292 (1981)). 
251 Regan, 461 U.S. at 549 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93–108). 
252 Regan, 461 U.S. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)). 
253 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001). 
254 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) 
255 See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542–43, 548-49 (finding viewpoint-based subsidy unconstitution-
al); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834–35, 837 (holding subsidy distributed on basis of viewpoint 
unconstitutional); see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 213 n.7 (2003) 
(plurality opinion) (confirming that Velazquez and Rosenberger are implicated when a sub-
sidy for private speech is distributed in a “viewpoint-based” manner); Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000) (sustaining student activity 
fee to fund extracurricular speech provided funds are distributed on a viewpoint-neutral 
basis). 
256 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827. 
257 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 538–39. 
258 The McComish concurrence cites to Rosenberger when noting that a non-participating can-
didate could have opted for public financing.  McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 529 & 
n.10 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30). 
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complies with the relevant requirement for constitutionality under 
Supreme Court precedent.260  Unlike the restrictions on speech at is-
 
259 Rescue funding provisions appear to be both content- or viewpoint-neutral under Su-
preme Court precedent because they do not “distinguish favored speech from disfavored 
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.”  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 643 (1994).  Regardless of his political views, any qualifying candidate can par-
ticipate in public financing and receive rescue funding.  Subsidies to participating candi-
dates thus “confer benefits . . . on speech without reference to the ideas or views ex-
pressed.”  Id.  The Day court relied on Turner to suggest that because rescue funding 
necessarily funds speech in support of a particular candidate, such a subsidy is by defini-
tion content-based.  Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360–61 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Turner, 
512 U.S. at 643).  Such a characterization of rescue funding would logically mean that any 
type of public financing is inherently content-based because it supports a particular can-
didate, but the Supreme Court has suggested quite the opposite.  See discussion supra  247 
(citing Supreme Court cases referring to the public financing system in Buckley as a con-
tent- or viewpoint-neutral subsidy).  The Day court therefore appears to be mistaken.   
260 The Court’s speech subsidy cases can be read as requiring speech subsidies to pass an ad-
ditional threshold for constitutionality beyond viewpoint-neutrality.  As the Supreme 
Court found in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, drawing upon Regan, speech 
subsidies must not forbid recipients from engaging in protected speech with private 
funds.  See 468 U.S. 364, 399–401 (1984) (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544, 552-53, 546 (1983)) (finding government subsidy unconstitu-
tional which prohibited public broadcasters from editorializing with private funds).  Such 
an analysis has been characterized as the “alternative channels” test.  Alliance For Open 
Soc’y Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  At least 
one commentator has suggested that because public financing places expenditure limita-
tions on participating candidates, such a subsidy fails the alternative channels test and is 
likely to be unconstitutional as a result.  See Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the Regula-
tion of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 819, 831–33 (2002).  But see Grant Davis-Denny, 
Coercion in Campaign Finance Reform:  A Closer Look at Footnote 65 of Buckley v. Valeo, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 205, 221 (2002) (concluding that expenditure limitations likely do not 
make public financing an unconstitutional subsidy under Supreme Court precedent).  
However, public financing can arguably be distinguished from the subsidy at issue in 
League of Women Voters because the latter subsidy placed content-based restrictions on re-
cipients by preventing them from editorializing.  League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 383–
84; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197–199 (1991) (applying alternative channels 
analysis to family planning subsidy which prevented recipients from engaging in abortion 
counseling).  Participating candidates face no content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on 
their campaign speech for which they require an alternative channel of speech; they can 
campaign on whatever platform they like.  They can also conduct non-campaign related 
speech with private funding.  Even if an alternative channels-based objection can legiti-
mately be raised about public financing under existing precedent, the Supreme Court is 
unlikely to take it seriously.  The Davis Court itself explicitly endorsed Buckley’s finding 
that voluntary expenditure limits for participating candidates was constitutional.  Davis v. 
FEC, 554 US. 724, 739 (2008) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (per 
curiam)) (distinguishing the statute at issue from the constitutional voluntary expendi-
ture limits on participating candidates in the Buckley scheme); see also Republican Nat’l 
Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (mem.) 
(rejecting unconstitutional conditions argument with respect to voluntary expenditure 
limitations).  Based on the foregoing, I do not believe the alternative channels test poses 
a serious challenge to the constitutionality of rescue funding.  Because public campaign 
funding involves the subsidization of private speakers to advocate their own views, several 
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sue in Davis, the distribution of a subsidy to a participating candidate 
only benefits the candidate; it is no more a penalty on the non-
participating candidate’s speech than the refusal to subsidize a lobby-
ing non-profit in Regan.261  Because a non-participating candidate is 
not penalized by the distribution of a subsidy to his opponent, the 
non-participating candidate retains the “unfettered right” to engage 
in campaign speech under a rescue funding provision, unlike the self-
financing candidate in Davis, whose speech was penalized by the acti-
vation of an asymmetrical scheme of contribution limits.262 
Through a flawed application of Davis, opponents of rescue fund-
ing seek to somehow transform a subsidy to a participating candidate 
into a restriction on the speech of a non-participating candidate, 
merely because the subsidy is distributed incrementally and triggered 
by an opponent’s speech.263  But such a claim not only lacks 
precedent, it would require the overturning of decades of Supreme 
Court precedent carefully distinguishing between penalties and non-
subsidies by mischaracterizing an additional subsidy as a penalty.264  As 
 
other of the Supreme Court’s speech subsidy cases appear to not be directly on point, but 
under such precedents trigger funding would likely survive constitutional scrutiny.  See, 
e.g., U.S. v. Am. Library Assoc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (plurality opinion) (finding that 
Congress may condition library subsidies on the installation of Internet filtering soft-
ware); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (finding that 
the government may make content-based decisions when distributing arts grants because 
“the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be 
impermissible were direct regulation of speech . . . at stake”); Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (find-
ing that the government need not fund family planning services advocating abortion be-
cause in so doing “the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has 
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other”); Lyng v. Int’l Union, 
485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988) (holding refusal to provide food stamps for striking workers 
constitutional because it does not “‘coerce’ belief” or require individuals “to participate 
in political activities or support political views with which they disagree”). 
261 See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 233, at 384. 
262 See Republican Nat’l Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 285 (noting that the “candidate remains free” 
to privately fund his campaign under the scheme); Brief for The Brennan Center For Jus-
tice at NYU School of Law in Opposition to Application for Writ of Injunction as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22, Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 131 S. Ct. 445 
(2010) (No. 10–A362), 2010 WL 4163768 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94) (“Under Buck-
ley’s rationale, since publicly funded candidates can constitutionally be awarded benefits 
not afforded to privately funded ones, the award of triggered supplemental funds to par-
ticipating candidates cannot be ‘discriminatory’ or ‘asymmetrical.’”). 
263 See Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Duke v. Leake, supra note 
236, at 15 (“Such an argument finds no support in the precedent of [the Supreme 
Court], including Davis, or in logic.”). 
264 What the Supreme Court’s precedents have been “careful” to establish is that a clear dis-
tinction between penalties and non-subsidies exists.  I have argued that as the law current-
ly stands on speech subsidies, rescue funding does not present even a close case for which 
side of the line it falls on.  Nonetheless, commentators analyzing the question of uncons-
titutional conditions from a theoretical perspective have at times struggled to determine 
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one commentator notes, such a step would “sub silentio wipe out sub-
sidies as well as burdens on campaign speech without even a mention 
of the distinction.”265  There is a fundamental “differen[ce]” between 
subsidizing a candidate’s speech based on his opponent’s choice to 
speak and restricting a candidate’s speech based on his own decision 
to speak,266 a distinction which Davis affirmed.267  As the McComish cir-
cuit court concurrence noted, citing Finley, a subsidy case, there is, 
quite simply, no “First Amendment right to prohibit the government 
from subsidizing one’s opponent.”268  Any loss of a competitive advan-
tage for the non-participating candidate occurs not because he is de-
nied a public subsidy for which he has no constitutional right to (hav-
ing chosen not to participate), but, like the non-qualifying candidates 
in Buckley, because he is unable to raise private contributions on his 
own.269  It is only restrictions on a candidate’s own speech rights that 
are constitutionally impermissible. 
 
exactly where the line between penalties and non-subsidies lies.  See, e.g., Richard Epstein, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 
(1988) (characterizing unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence as an “issue that for 
over a hundred years has bedeviled courts and commentators alike”); Kathleen Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (1989) (describing recent un-
constitutional conditions cases as a “minefield to be traversed gingerly”). 
265 The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 233, at 384. In response to The 
Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, Esenberg argues that the distinction between 
subsidies and penalties is inapplicable in the context of electoral politics because “[i]n an 
election, what helps one side directly and immediately harms the other.  The subsidy to 
an opponent necessarily burdens the speaker.”  Esenberg, supra note 169, at 324.  But it is 
hard to see how such a blanket assertion squares with Buckley’s finding that public financ-
ing is constitutional. 
266 The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 233, at 383. 
267 Davis itself distinguished between the “unfettered right” to privately-finance under Buckley 
and the “quite different” scheme at issue in the case.  Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 
(2008).   
268 McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 529 & n.9 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (citing Nat’l 
Endowment For The Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998)). 
269 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94–95 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]he inability . . . of [non-
participating candidates] to wage effective campaigns will derive not from lack of public 
funding but from their inability to raise private contributions.”); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173, 202 (1991) (“The difficulty that a woman encounters when a Title X project 
does not provide abortion counseling or referral leaves her in no different position than 
she would have been if the Government had not enacted Title X.”); Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (“Although TWR does not have 
as much money as it wants, and thus cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it 
would like, the Constitution ‘does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be ne-
cessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.’”) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 318 (1980)); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (“The Connecticut regulation 
places no obstacles . . . in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.  An indigent wom-
an . . . continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she de-
sires.”). 
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3.  Opponents of Trigger Funding Misread Pacific Gas:  The Davis 
Court’s Citation to Pacific Gas in Fact Supports the Penalty/Non-Subsidy 
Distinction 
The distinction between the scheme at issue in Davis and match-
ing funding provisions is further illustrated by the Davis Court’s cita-
tion to Pacific Gas.270  Opponents of rescue funding, including the 
McComish plaintiffs, have pointed to this citation in support of their 
claim that trigger funding is unconstitutional.271  A closer reading of 
Pacific Gas, however, suggests the opposite conclusion.  The Pacific 
Gas case concerned a state regulation that required a private utility 
company to include announcements from third parties in its mailings 
expressing viewpoints with which it disagreed.272  In finding trigger 
funding to be constitutional, the Daggett court cited Pacific Gas for the 
principle that there exists “no right to speak ‘free from vigorous de-
bate.’”273  In Davis, on the other hand, the Court cited Pacific Gas for 
the proposition that there was “[an] infringement on speech rights 
where if the plaintiff spoke it could ‘be forced . . . to help disseminate 
hostile views.’”274 
The Pacific Gas Court made clear that the state regulation in the 
case was a “government restriction[] that abridge[d] [the utility’s] 
own rights.”275  It was, in other words, a case that, like Davis, fell on 
the penalty side of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  As 
the Pacific Gas Court made clear, the state regulation at issue 
require[d] [the] appellant to assist in disseminating [the third-party’s] 
views . . . .  This kind of favoritism goes well beyond the fundamentally 
content-neutral subsidies that we sustained in Buckley and in Re-
 
270 Davis, 554 U.S. at 739 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 
(1986) (plurality opinion)). 
271 See, e.g., Brief to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner’s Brief II at 17, McComish v. 
Bennett, 2010 WL 3267529 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010) (No. 10–239) [hereinafter Petitioner’s 
Brief II] (“[C]ontrary to Davis’ embrace of Pacific Gas . . .  Arizona’s matching funds trig-
ger effectively forces traditional candidates and their supporters to disseminate hostile 
speech by opposing participating candidates.”); Reply Brief to Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 7, McComish v. Bennett, 2010 WL 3267529 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010) (No. 10-239) 
(“There is no question Arizona’s matching funds trigger causes privately financed candi-
dates and their supporters to help disseminate hostile views whenever they raise or spend 
campaign money over a certain threshold.  Davis’s reliance on Pacific Gas . . . , therefore, 
compels the conclusion that Arizona’s matching funds trigger infringes speech rights.”); 
Crosland, supra note 26, at 1301 (suggesting that the Davis Court’s citation to Pacific Gas 
means “a right to speak free from response does exist” in the context of trigger funding). 
272 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 4. 
273 Daggett v. Comm. on Govern. Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464 (1st Cir. 
2000) (quoting Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 14). 
274 Davis, 554 U.S. at 739 (quoting Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 14). 
275 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 14. 
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gan . . . .  Unlike these permissible government subsidies of speech, [the 
state] . . . forces the speaker’s opponent—not the taxpaying public—to as-
sist in disseminating the speaker’s message.276 
Thus, the Court explains that had the state regulation merely pro-
vided a subsidy to a third-party to disseminate its views, such a regula-
tion would have been constitutionally permissible.  Because the regu-
lation instead chose to restrict the utility’s speech by forcing it to 
publish a view it disagreed with, it was a constitutionally impermissi-
ble restriction on speech.  Unlike the provision in Davis, which re-
stricted the speech of a self-financing candidate, rescue funding is a 
“permissible government subsid[y] of speech” in which “the taxpay-
ing public” and not “the speaker’s [i.e. participating candidate’s] op-
ponent” assists in disseminating the participating candidate’s mes-
sage.277  By viewing Davis as analogous to Pacific Gas, which in turn 
expressly distinguished itself from Buckley, the Supreme Court impli-
citly suggested that public campaign financing—of which rescue 
funding is a part—was different in kind from the regulation at issue 
in Davis. 
 
B.  Reviving Old Claims About Public Financing:  Participating Candidates 
Do Not Receive a Competitive Advantage from Trigger Funding 
The Millionaire’s Amendment can also be distinguished from 
trigger provisions in another fundamental respect.  A critical compo-
nent of the Court’s analysis in Davis was that “[u]nder the usual cir-
cumstances,” candidates running for Congress faced the same contri-
bution limits.278  Only after a candidate triggered the activation of the 
scheme by self-financing did the competing candidates face different 
contribution limits.  Because the two candidates were similarly si-
tuated prior to the scheme’s activation, it was clear that a candidate’s 
decision to self-finance “produce[d] fundraising advantages for op-
ponents in the competitive context of electoral politics.”279  The Scott 
court seized on this line from Davis to suggest that trigger funding 
was analogous to the scheme at issue in Davis.280 
 
276 Id. at 14–15 (second and third emphasis added). 
277 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 15.  The McComish district court, when ruling on a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, failed to recognize this distinction in its discussion of Davis’s 
treatment of Pacific Gas.  McComish v. Brewer, No. cv-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2008 WL 
4629337, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2008), rev’d sub nom McComish v. Bennett, 610 F.3d 510 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
278 Davis, 554 U.S. at 728. 
279 Id. at 739. 
280 Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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But the assertion that trigger funding provides a participating 
candidate with a competitive advantage281 misapprehends the nature 
of public campaign financing and revives a claim rejected long ago by 
the Court in Buckley.  As the McComish circuit court correctly noted, 
citing to Buckley, a candidate who chooses to participate in public fi-
nancing and a non-participating candidate are not similarly situated, 
making Davis “easily and properly distinguish[able]” from the case of 
trigger funding.282  Unlike the regulatory scheme in Davis, in which 
both candidates initially faced the same contribution limits, a partici-
pating candidate, in return for receiving public funds (including 
trigger funding), agrees to expenditure and contribution limitations 
not faced by a non-participating candidate.  Buckley held such diffe-
rential treatment to be constitutional:  “The Constitution does not 
require Congress to treat all declared candidates the same for public 
financing purposes.”283  This holding also finds theoretical support:  
An authoritative commentator on the Court’s subsidy jurisprudence 
has suggested that the distribution of a subsidy to one of two individ-
uals who are not similarly situated does not penalize the non-
recipient, but merely benefits the recipient.284 
 
281 See, e.g., id. at 1284 (“Scott explains that he has a constitutional right to avoid providing 
his opponents ‘with a competitive advantage.’”); Petitioner’s Brief II, supra note 271, at 17 
(asserting that by providing “competitive disadvantages” to non-participating candidates, 
trigger funding violates the First Amendment); Esenberg, supra  170, at 325 (arguing that 
triggered subsidies are especially problematic because they “impair[] the ‘speech power’ 
of the non-participating candidate relative to the participating candidate”). 
282 McComish, 611 F.3d at 521 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 97 (1976) (per curiam)); 
see also Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 20 (“Arizona’s system does not discriminate 
among similarly situated candidates.”); Paul S. Ryan, Public Financing After Davis:  Denial of 
Appeal in Duke v. Leake Should Put to Rest Concerns Regarding the Constitutionality of Trigger 
Provisions, THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Dec. 24, 2008), http://
www.voterownedhawaii.org/uploads/PF%20Triggers%20and%20Davis%2012%2024%20
08.pdf (“Comparing a system in which candidates start under the same rules (e.g., the 
Millionaire’s Amendment system) to a system in which candidates start under different 
rules (e.g., a public financing system) is comparing apples to oranges.”).  But see infra  348 
(suggesting when the not similarly situated rationale might not apply). 
283 McComish, 611 F.3d at 522 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 97). 
284 See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:  The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive 
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1363–71 (1984) (explaining that a subsidy’s constitutionali-
ty must be evaluated with reference to whether recipients and non-recipients are “similar-
ly situated”); id. at 1374–75 (“If the purpose of the NEA is to fund good art and cubism 
can reasonably be considered ‘good’ art while pointillism can reasonably be considered 
‘bad’ art, then pointillists and cubists are not similarly situated for the purposes of the 
program, and a condition excluding the pointillists from receiving benefits does not vi-
olate principles of equality.”).  Notably, Kreimer finds that, after analyzing the Buckley 
scheme under his three baseline tests for unconstitutional speech subsidies, eligible but 
non-participating candidates were not penalized by the distribution of public funding to 
participating candidates.  Id. at 1376–77.  If the government did not have the ability to 
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Because candidates accepting public funding “suffer a countervail-
ing denial” in the form of an expenditure limit,285  the Buckley Court 
explicitly rejected the claim that public campaign funding provides 
candidates with what the Davis court referred to as “fundraising ad-
vantages.”286  In the words of the Buckley Court, qualifying, participat-
ing candidates do not receive “enhancement of the opportunity to 
communicate with the electorate”287 from public funding because 
such subsidies are designed to “substitute[] public funding for what 
the [candidates] would raise privately.”288  This is precisely why the 
Court upheld the denial of such funding for minor party candi-
dates.289 
Viewed in this light, trigger subsidies appear to be a more constitu-
tionally sound means of providing campaign financing than simply 
distributing an initial lump grant that might prove too large if non-
participating candidates spend little.  Trigger funding, on the other 
hand, is calibrated to provide the amount of funding that a partici-
pating candidate would spend in response to his opponent’s spend-
ing if he were privately financed.290  The evidence suggests this was 
indeed the rationale behind the Arizona statute at issue in McCo-
mish.291  As the lead drafter of the Clean Elections Act explained, a 
“wide disparity” in campaign spending existed prior to the Act’s pas-
 
fund only those participating candidates who agreed to abide by expenditure limitations, 
the program would serve little purpose and likely cease to exist.  Id. at 1377. 
285 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95.   
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at n.129.  Because public financing, which may include trigger funding, is designed to 
replace, not supplement, private fundraising for a participating candidate, it does not 
“skew[] . . . an existing distribution” of speech rights by providing funding only to the 
participating candidate.  Sullivan, supra  264, at 1497; see id. at 1496–98 (arguing that the 
government has a constitutional obligation of “evenhandedness” among speakers by not 
favoring one group with subsidies).  Trigger funding thus meets one of Sullivan’s tests for 
a presumptively constitutional subsidy. 
289 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95. 
290 That a candidate would spend an amount equal to his opponent’s expenditures is of 
course speculative, but it is no less speculative than providing qualifying presidential can-
didates with a $20 million (adjusted for inflation) grant for their general election ex-
penditures, an amount upheld in Buckley.  See id. at 88 (discussing funding of qualifying 
candidates). 
291 See McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 527 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that trigger funding 
allows Arizona “to allocate its funding among races of varying levels of competitiveness 
without having to make qualitative evaluations of which candidates are more ‘deserving’ 
of funding beyond the base amounts provided to all [participating] candidates”); Res-
pondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 30 (“Arizona uses actual contributions and spending as 
a proxy for the competitiveness of a particular race, and it then adjusts its public grants in 
dynamic fashion (using triggered matching funds).”). 
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sage.292  In at least 80% of Arizona’s election districts, campaign 
spending prior to the Act’s passage amounted to only $10,000 or 
less.293  But in a small number of districts, campaign spending aver-
aged $30,000.294  The use of trigger funding was therefore necessary 
because a single uniform subsidy would not accurately represent the 
amount a participating candidate would spend were he privately fi-
nanced.295  As the drafter noted, no candidate in a high-spending dis-
trict would choose public financing if he were offered a single subsidy 
that amounted to only one-third of average campaign spending.296  
Providing all candidates with a $30,000 subsidy would also not ap-
proximate average campaign spending in most districts but would 
“waste[]” “millions of dollars.”297 
Furthermore, practically speaking, far from being at a fundraising 
advantage, publicly financed candidates are usually at a fundraising 
disadvantage, because public financing schemes with trigger funding 
like that in McComish still subject participating candidates to a maxi-
mum expenditure cap, while privately financed candidates can con-
tinue to spend as much as they wish.298  To quote the McComish and 
Buckley courts, “Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treat-
ing things that are different as though they were exactly alike.”299 
Because participating and non-participating candidates are not 
similarly situated, but subject to different regulatory regimes, analyz-
ing the distribution of rescue funding in isolation misses the point.  
Rescue funding forms only part of the package of burdens and bene-
fits that makes up the configuration of a public financing system.300  
 
292 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 7 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. at 7–8 (“[A] one-size-fits-all approach would not work in Arizona.”). 
296 See id. at 7 (“[I]t would be ‘too easy to outspend the Clean Elections candidate and no 
one would run as a Clean Elections candidate.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
297 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
298 McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This means that a non-
participating candidate who is able to raise funds in excess of three times the amount of 
his or her participating candidate’s initial grant gains a potentially unlimited financial ad-
vantage in the campaign.”); see also Daggett v. Comm. on Govern. Ethics & Election Prac-
tices, 205 F.3d 445, 468 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A] non-participating candidate retains the abili-
ty to outraise and outspend her participating opponent with abandon after [the 
maximum expenditure] limit is reached.”); discussion infra note 300 (arguing that inde-
pendent expenditure groups are at a fundraising advantage versus participating candi-
dates but acknowledging that the “not similarly situated” rationale has less relevance in 
the independent expenditure context). 
299 McComish, 611 F.3d at 522 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 97–98 (1976) (per cu-
riam)). 
300 For example, a public financing system which provides rescue funding may provide an 
initial grant far smaller than a system lacking trigger provisions.  Once the maximum 
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As the RNC court explained, a rational candidate “will opt” for the 
package of burdens and benefits exclusive to public funding “only if, 
in the candidate’s view, it will enhance the candidate’s powers of 
communication.”301  The proper analysis would focus on the earlier 
time period before the distribution of trigger funding when both 
candidates are similarly situated—that is, when they are both eligible 
to opt for public financing—to determine whether the entire pack-
age offered by a public financing system is so generous as to effective-
ly penalize the choice to not participate. 
Courts considering the constitutionality of public financing sys-
tems as a whole have undertaken such an analysis by insisting that 
they must not coerce participation:  In other words, they must re-
quire participating candidates to suffer significant restrictions not 
faced by privately financed candidates in return for receiving public 
financing.302  This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s speech sub-
sidy jurisprudence, which requires that a subsidy not be “ ‘manipu-
lated’ to have a ‘coercive effect.’”303  In Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano,304 
 
amount of potentially triggered subsidies are taken into account, however, the amount of 
funds offered to a participating candidate under both systems may be the same.  There 
appears to be no logical basis to distinguish between the two systems, but this is precisely 
the result of analyzing rescue funding in isolation without considering its role in a public 
financing system as a whole. 
301 Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also McComish, 
611 F.3d at 529 & n.10 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 829–30 (1995)) (noting that a non-participating candidate 
could have opted for public funding).  Admittedly, independent expenditure groups do 
not have a choice whether to opt for public financing, and the “not similarly situated ra-
tionale” may have less significance with respect to such groups.  However, it is also true 
that like non-participating candidates, independent expenditure groups are not at a fun-
draising disadvantage vis-à-vis participating candidates because of the groups’ ability to 
spend unlimited funds opposing participating candidates or supporting non-participating 
candidates.  Furthermore, the application of trigger funding provisions to spending by 
independent expenditure groups can also be justified by the compelling state interest in 
preventing corruption.  See discussion infra Part V-C (explaining why trigger funding pro-
visions survive heightened scrutiny review with respect to both non-participating candi-
dates and independent expenditure groups). 
302 See, e.g., Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that a public 
financing system was not coercive); see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1550 
(8th Cir. 1996) (using a test of coerciveness to hold a public financing system constitu-
tional). 
303 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, 
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  Among the members of 
the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has probably been the most insistent that a subsidy is 
not a restriction on speech because it does not generally have a “coercive effect.”  Nat’l 
Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 587 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see 
id. at 599 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The nub of the difference between me and the Court 
is that I regard the distinction between ‘abridging’ speech and funding it as a fundamen-
tal divide, on [the latter] side of which the First Amendment is inapplicable.”). 
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the First Circuit explained that Rhode Island’s public financing sys-
tem was constitutional because it “achieve[d] a rough proportionality 
between the advantages available to complying candidates . . . and the 
restrictions that such candidates must accept to receive these advan-
tages.”305  In other words, “the state exacts a fair price from complying 
candidates in exchange for [the] receipt of the challenged bene-
fits.”306  On the other hand, courts have struck down campaign financ-
ing systems that simply provide a participating candidate with bene-
fits, while failing to impose on them sufficient “countervailing” 
restrictions not faced by privately financed candidates.307 
C.  Trigger Funding Provisions are Constitutional Under Heightened Scrutiny 
Review 
As a viewpoint-neutral government subsidy, trigger funding 
should not be subjected to heightened scrutiny at all.308  Under a ra-
tional basis analysis, rescue funding is plainly constitutional.309  But 
even if a court treated trigger funding as a burden on a non-
participating candidate’s or independent expenditure group’s First 
Amendment rights, trigger funding should survive heightened scru-
tiny as well.  The McComish circuit court was the sole circuit court in 
the aftermath of Davis to subject trigger provisions to intermediate 
scrutiny;310 the Scott and Green Party courts, analogizing the burdens of 
 
304 Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 26. 
305 Id. at 39. 
306 Id. 
307 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 930 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (finding that scheme 
with disparity in contribution limits for participating and non-participating candidates 
penalizes privately financed candidates); see also Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 
1422, 1425 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that expenditure limit scheme offered only benefits 
to participating candidates and penalized non-participating candidates). 
308 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547–51 (applying 
rational basis scrutiny to selective subsidy); id. at 549 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
93–108 (1976) (per curiam) (“[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a 
fundamental right . . . is not subject to strict scrutiny.”)); see also McComish v. Bennett, 
611 F.3d 510, 528 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (arguing that heigh-
tened scrutiny is inapplicable) (citing N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political 
Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 437 (4th Cir. 2008), and Daggett v. Comm. on Go-
vern. Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
309 Trigger funding is rationally related to the state’s legitimate anticorruption interest.  See 
discussion infra notes 325–49 and accompanying text (discussing how trigger funding 
serves the anticorruption interest); cf. Regan, 461 U.S. at 549–51 (finding selective gov-
ernment subsidization rationally related to legitimate government interests). 
310 McComish, 611 F.3d at 524. 
1182 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
trigger funding to the burden at issue in Davis, applied strict scruti-
ny.311 
There are a number of state interests articulated for trigger provi-
sions:  They reduce corruption or its appearance by encouraging par-
ticipation in public financing systems,312 they equalize resources,313 
and they preserve the public fisc.314  For example, the McComish cir-
cuit court found that with respect to the Citizens Clean Elections Act, 
“one of the principal purposes of the Act was to reduce quid pro quo 
corruption.”315  Its explicit purpose was to “diminish[] the influence 
of special-interest money” and eliminate the status quo provided by 
the “current election-financing system.”316  That system “[a]llow[ed] 
Arizona elected officials to accept large campaign contributions from 
private interests over which they have governmental jurisdiction” and 
“[u]ndermine[d] public confidence in the integrity of public offi-
cials.”317  The court also found, however, that this was not the sole 
 
311 Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough under Davis the sub-
sidy must be justified by a compelling state interest, the Secretary and McCollum insist 
that the subsidy satisfies that test.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Green Party of 
Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 245 (2d Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Green 
Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 2010 WL 5126519 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2010) (No. 10-795) (“[T]o be 
upheld under plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the provision must be justified by a 
compelling state interest.”). 
312 See, e.g., Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that trigger funding, 
by encouraging candidate participation, reduces corruption); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 
101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996) (encouraging participation in public funding 
through rescue provision decreases corruption); see also Vote Choice, Inc., v. DiStefano, 4 
F.3d 26, 39–40 (1st Cir. 1993) (incentivizing participation in public financing serves anti-
corruption interest). 
313 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-940 (2010) (creating a public financing system intended to 
change the status quo that “[g]ives incumbents an unhealthy advantage over challengers” 
and “[e]ffectively suppresses the voices and influence of the vast majority of Arizona citi-
zens in favor of a small number of wealthy special interests”). 
314 See, e.g., Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d 298, 373 (D. Conn. 2009), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (discounting argument that public financ-
ing served a compelling state interest in protecting the public fisc, based not on merits 
but on specific facts of case); Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 33 (“Triggered match-
ing funds are one important approach to achieving the compelling purposes of public fi-
nancing while protecting the public fisc . . . .”); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976) 
(per curiam) (finding that the government has an “interest in not funding hopeless can-
didacies with large sums of public money”). 
315 McComish, 611 F.3d at 516. 
316 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 (2010). 
317 See id.  The public financing systems of other states that include trigger funding also proc-
laim an anticorruption purpose.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 163-278.61 (2010) (ex-
plaining that the statute’s purpose was to combat the “detrimental effects of increasingly 
large amounts of money being raised and spent to influence the outcome of [judicial] 
elections,” which threatened the “integrity and credibility” of judges). 
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purpose of the Act,318 and there is evidence to suggest that an equali-
zation rationale may also have been behind the legislation.319 
Admittedly, though Buckley had held as much,320 Davis extinguish-
es any claim that trigger funding could survive heightened scrutiny 
on the basis of an equalization rationale:  It is, quite simply, not “a le-
gitimate government objective.”321  Davis and Citizens United, read to-
gether, confirm that the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its 
appearance remains the only “legitimate and compelling”322 govern-
ment interest.323 
Contrary to the protestations of trigger funding opponents,324 res-
cue funding does serve the anticorruption interest.325  In the words of 
 
318 McComish, 611 F.3d at 514. 
319 See Petitioner’s Brief I, supra note 173, at 4–5 (presenting evidence that a purpose of the 
Act was to “‘level the playing field’”); see also supra note 313 (citing language in the Act 
suggesting an equalizing purpose). 
320 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49 (“[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment.”). 
321 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904, 
921 (2010) (reaffirming Davis’s and Buckley’s rejection of the equalizing rationale). 
322 Davis, 554 U.S. at 741 (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 
480, 496–97 (1985)). 
323 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909–10. 
324 See, e.g., McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs contend that 
the Act’s true purposes were to level the political playing field and reduce campaign 
spending.”). 
325 The Green Party district court appears to suggest that any distribution of matching fund-
ing, which encourages participation in public financing, amounts to an attempt to “level 
the playing field.”  Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d 298, 373 (D. Conn. 
2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court noted:  “Practically speaking . . . there is no real difference between 
those two concepts [encouraging participation and equaliza-
tion] . . . . [T]he . . . matching fund provisions ensure candidates that the playing field 
will be leveled so that the baseline grants . . . will never hamstring their ability to mount a 
successful campaign against a high spending opponent . . . .”  Id.  Such a claim may be 
partially due to the unique facts of the case; the initial grants to participating candidates 
in Green Party were alone large enough to ensure a competitive race for a participating 
candidate.  See infra note 339 and accompanying text (discussing the Connecticut system).  
But such a claim also ignores the fact that a public financing system must be attractive to 
the rational candidate in order to gain any participants at all.  See Gable v. Patton, 142 
F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[A] voluntary campaign finance scheme must rely on in-
centives for participation, which, by definition, means structuring the scheme so that par-
ticipation is usually the rational choice.”); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1555 
(8th Cir. 1996) (“If the benefits . . . were conferred upon all candidates . . . there would 
be no incentive to participate, and the State’s goals of decreasing the chances of corrup-
tion  . . . would be frustrated.”); cf. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (explaining that a candidate will choose public financing only if it will 
“enhance” his ability to communicate with the electorate).  Thus, the fact that a system is 
attractive to a rational candidate does not mean that it ipso facto “level[s] the playing the 
field.”  See also Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 21 n.8 (“Nothing in this Court’s pre-
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the Buckley Court:  “It cannot be gainsaid that public financing as a 
means of eliminating the improper influence of large private contri-
butions furthers a significant governmental interest.”326  Thus, public 
financing reduces quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and 
rescue funding is necessary to encourage participation in public fi-
nancing systems.  Such a claim, as the Scott court rightly observed, is 
“not novel.”327  The Rosenstiel, Gable, and McComish courts all found 
that the anticorruption interest justified rescue provisions, the former 
two under strict scrutiny.328 
As the McComish court noted, Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections 
Act was passed in the aftermath of AzScam, a bribery scandal ensnar-
ing nearly 10% of the Arizona legislature on civil or criminal 
charges.329  State legislators were caught on videotape accepting cam-
paign contributions and bribes.330  Thus, the Act was presented to 
voters as designed to change Arizona’s “reputation [as] a state rife 
with corruption and the abuse of money in politics . . . .” in which 
“[o]ur elected officials are going to jail and this cycle of abuse seems 
endless.”331  Arizona is not alone in passing a public financing system 
in response to state corruption.332 
Courts striking down trigger funding, however, find that trigger 
funding still fails to withstand heightened scrutiny even if it serves the 
anticorruption interest.333  First, they point to language in Davis sug-
gesting that a burden on the personal expenditures of non-
participating candidates or independent expenditure groups can 
never be justified on the basis of the anticorruption interest.334  But 
 
cedents suggests that a publicly financed candidate be unable to engage in the responsive 
speech that a privately financed candidate would undertake as a matter of course.”). 
326 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976) (per curiam). 
327 Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010). 
328 McComish, 611 F.3d at 525 (applying intermediate scrutiny); supra note 312 (discussing 
application of strict scrutiny in Rosenstiel and Gable on the basis of an anticorruption in-
terest). 
329 McComish, 611 F.3d at 514. 
330 Id. 
331 Id. at 515 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
332 See, e.g., Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2010), petition for 
cert. filed sub nom. Green Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 2010 WL 5126519 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2010) 
(No. 10-795) (noting that Connecticut’s public financing system was passed in response 
to “many corruption scandals,” resulting in the state’s nickname of “‘Corrupticut’”) 
(quoting Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d 298, 307–08 (D. Conn. 2009), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
333 See Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding Florida’s matching 
funds provision does not survive strict scrutiny); Green Party, 616 F.3d at 245–46 (holding 
that Connecticut’s trigger provision fails strict scrutiny). 
334 See, e.g., Green Party, 616 F.3d at 245–246 (finding that Davis was “clear” that a burden on 
personal expenditures can never serve the anticorruption interest); see also Crosland, su-
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what Davis, relying on Buckley, found was that restrictions on personal 
expenditures standing alone do not serve the anticorruption interest 
with respect to the burdened candidate;335 the assertion that personal 
expenditure restrictions always disserve the anticorruption interest 
proves too much.336  To the extent rescue funding burdens a non-
participating candidate or independent expenditure group, such bur-
den is coupled with a reduction in campaign contributions for the 
participating candidate, which, as Buckley makes clear, expressly serves 
the anticorruption interest.337  Focusing on the source of the non-
participating candidate’s or independent expenditure group’s fund-
ing misses the point:  “In order to promote participation in the pro-
gram, and reduce the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the 
State must be able to ensure that participating candidates will be able 
to mount competitive campaigns, no matter what the source of their oppo-
nent’s funding.”338 
The second objection to rescue funding is that it is not narrowly 
tailored—a less restrictive alternative is available—and thus it fails 
strict scrutiny.339  Here, the differences between the Arizona system in 
McComish and the systems found unconstitutional become manifest, 
suggesting why the former is narrowly tailored, even if the others may 
 
pra note 26, at 1312 (interpreting Davis to hold that discouraging personal expenditures 
never serves the anticorruption interest). 
335 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008) (“The burden imposed by [the Millionaire’s Amend-
ment] on the expenditure of personal funds is not justified by any governmental interest 
in eliminating corruption . . . .  [The Millionaire’s Amendment], by discouraging use of 
personal funds, disserves the anticorruption interest.”) (emphasis added). 
336 For example, Buckley held that placing restrictions on expenditures of candidates (includ-
ing personal expenditures) participating in public financing systems is constitutional.  
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65. (1976) (per curiam).  RNC found that expenditure 
limitations in the context of public campaign financing were justified by a compelling an-
ticorruption interest.  Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980).  The Scott court appeared to misinterpret Buckley and Davis entirely by suggesting 
at one point that the burden placed on the expenditures of participating candidates by the 
scheme at issue did not serve the anticorruption interest.  See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1293 
(“[B]y encouraging individuals to accept a limit on personal expenditures, the subsidy 
does not appear to reduce corruption.”). 
337 See supra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley’s holding that public financ-
ing serves the anticorruption interest). 
338 McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 526 (9th Cir. 2010). 
339 See, e.g., Scott, 612 F.3d at 1294 (finding that public financing system is not narrowly tai-
lored because releasing participating candidates from an expenditure limit would be less 
restrictive); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d 298, 373 (D. Conn. 2009), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that matching funds are not 
necessary because initial funds are sufficient for participating candidates to run competi-
tive races). 
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not be based on their unique facts.340  In Green Party, for example, the 
initial grant provided to candidates was equivalent to the amount 
needed to run a competitive race; the provision of trigger funding 
was not needed to encourage participation and thus its true justifica-
tion appeared to be an equalizing one.341  In Arizona, on the other 
hand, the state cannot afford to give each candidate a full grant in 
the amount needed to run a competitive race in all districts;342 in-
stead, it chooses to give each candidate one-third of what it considers 
the competitive amount in certain districts and distributes the rest 
when necessary via a trigger provision.343  Because of the size of the 
initial grant, without trigger funding, many candidates for office in 
Arizona would simply not participate in public financing,344 and “a 
public financing system with no participants does nothing to re-
duce . . . quid pro quo corruption.”345  Furthermore, an existing re-
strictive contribution limit scheme had demonstrated itself to be in-
sufficient to stem political corruption with the outbreak of AzScam,346 
and other means of providing effective public financing were ex-
amined and rejected by the legislature as inadequate.347  In Scott, the 
provision at issue, unlike that in McComish, allowed participating can-
didates to continue receiving private contributions, so it is less clear 
how providing an additional subsidy to participants reduced corrup-
tion.348  Also, the Day court viewed the anticorruption rationale as a 
 
340 For further discussion of the implications of the different state systems, addressing many 
of the same distinctions, see Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 19 n.7, 25–32. 
341 Green Party, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 373 (holding the trigger funds served an equalizing ratio-
nale that did not survive strict scrutiny); cf. Bob Bauer, Something To Be Said for Davis?, 
MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Jul. 3, 2008), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/
news.html?AID=1295 (“A more aggressive—some would say, punitive—measure to “level 
the playing field,” such as removing the overall spending or contribution limits for the 
publicly funded candidate, could well provoke the Court to a Davis-like objection.”). 
342 See McComish, 611 F.3d at 527 (“[I]f the Act were to raise the amount of its lump-sum 
grants and do away with matching funds altogether, it would make the Act prohibitively 
expensive and spell its doom.”). 
343 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 29–30 (describing the rationale behind Arizona’s 
trigger provision). 
344 Id. at 23 (discussing testimony of various individuals, including participating candidates, 
saying that absent trigger provisions, participation in Arizona’s public funding would de-
cline). 
345 McComish, 611 F.3d at 527. 
346 See id. at 514 (noting that a contribution limit scheme was in place when AzScam oc-
curred). 
347 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 24 n.9. 
348 Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The parties have not sufficiently 
explained how the Florida public financing system furthers the anticorruption interest.”);  
id. (“[With the exception of imposing expenditure limitations and granting a subsidy,] 
the system enables candidates who run campaigns that are indistinguishable from the 
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mere pretext for justifying trigger funding because participation in 
public financing in Minnesota was already near 100% prior to the 
enactment of the rescue provision.349 
Thus, the facts of McComish suggest that trigger funding can sur-
vive a strict scrutiny analysis on the basis of an anticorruption interest, 
but the court in the case declined to rule as much.350  Under a lower 
level of intermediate scrutiny, there is clearly a “substantial relation” 
between matching funding and the “sufficiently important” govern-
mental interest of preventing corruption,351 for reasons just dis-
cussed.352  As the court in McComish noted, the evidence is unclear 
that the speech of non-participating candidates or independent ex-
penditure groups was even chilled at all.353  More generally, if the 
speech of non-participating candidates in Arizona was typically 
chilled, it would be expected that most non-participating candidates 
would spend right up to the triggering threshold, but no further.354  
But this did not occur.355  Like disclosure requirements which may 
discourage expenditures on political speech by those who wish to re-
main private, “the burden [of matching funding provisions] is merely 
a theoretical chilling effect on donors who might dislike the statutory 
result of making a contribution or candidates who may seek a tactical 
advantage related to the release or timing of matching funds.”356  As 
the Citizens United Court reaffirmed, intermediate scrutiny applies to 
disclosure requirements because they “impose no ceiling on cam-
paign-related activities” and “do not prevent anyone from speak-
ing.”357  Matching funding is far closer to a disclosure requirement 
 
campaigns of nonparticipants like Scott.”).  Likewise, trigger provisions that merely re-
move an expenditure limitation on a participating candidate, allowing him to take in pri-
vate contributions, are less likely to be justifiable as reducing corruption; they are also less 
likely to be justifiable under the “not similarly situated” rationale.  See Respondent’s Brief, 
supra note 82, at 27 (suggesting that subsidies to one of two closely situated candidates 
might trigger a Davis-like penalty and not serve the anticorruption interest). 
349 Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1361 (8th Cir. 1994). 
350 McComish, 611 F.3d at 526 n.10 (noting it was unnecessary to decide whether the Act 
would survive strict scrutiny when it is only subject to intermediate scrutiny). 
351 Id. at 525 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010)).  
352 See supra notes 323–50  and accompanying text (discussing why trigger funding serves the 
compelling anticorruption interest and is narrowly tailored to serve such an interest). 
353 See supra 204 (discussing the McComish court’s finding that there was a lack of evidence 
that plaintiffs were, in fact, chilled). 
354 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 10. 
355 Id. (discussing testimony of expert explaining that 45 of 46 candidates in 2006 spent ei-
ther well under or over the triggering threshold). 
356 McComish, 611 F.3d at 525. 
357 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 
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than the direct restriction on speech at issue in Davis, suggesting that 
intermediate scrutiny is much more appropriate than strict scrutiny if 
heightened scrutiny is to be applied.358 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As the McComish district court astutely observed, “[p]laintiffs’ ar-
gument is that an award under the current regime . . . (the initial 
grant plus some matching funds) violates their rights [under the First 
Amendment], but an award of twice that amount (not based on 
matching funds) would not.”359  Prior to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Davis v. FEC, courts generally refused to accept such an “illog-
ical”360 argument, with all but the Eighth Circuit in Day v. Holahan 
finding trigger provisions constitutional.  But since Davis, two circuits 
have found that Davis compels a finding that trigger provisions are 
unconstitutional, and the Ninth Circuit’s finding in favor of Arizona’s 
trigger provisions has been appealed to the Supreme Court in McCo-
mish v. Bennett.  Supporters of rescue funding fear the worst. 
In McComish, the Supreme Court has an important opportunity to 
preserve the constitutionality of trigger funding by clarifying the 
meaning of Davis.  An application of Davis to trigger provisions mis-
takes the fundamental nature of the case’s holding.  Davis did not 
hold that any time a scheme provides a benefit to one candidate as a 
result of his opponent’s spending, the opponent suffers an unconsti-
tutional burden on his speech.  The Davis holding was far narrower, 
focusing on the fact that a self-financing candidate was burdened by 
the activation of a scheme of discriminatory contribution limits for 
similarly situated candidates.  In contrast, rescue funding, as the Su-
preme Court’s speech subsidy jurisprudence makes clear, is the dis-
 
U.S. 93, 201 (2003)); see also McComish, 611 F.3d at 525 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
at 914 ). 
358 The McComish concurrence reasons that any election law creates strategic decisions for 
candidates, and thus the fact that non-participating candidates might make the strategic 
choice not to trigger matching funds for their participating opponents presents no cog-
nizable burden calling for heightened scrutiny.  See McComish, 611 F.3d at 528 (Kleinfeld, 
J., concurring) (“That different laws generate different strategies does not make them re-
strictions on speech.”); see also N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Ex-
penditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 438 (4th Cir. 2008) (“To the extent that the plain-
tiffs . . . are in fact deterred . . . from spending in excess of the trigger amounts, the 
deterrence results from a strategic, political choice, not from a threat of government cen-
sure or prosecution.”). 
359 McComish v. Brewer, No. CV–08–1550–PHX–ROS, 2010 WL 2292213, at *8 n.13 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 20, 2010), rev’d sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010). 
360 Id. at *7. 
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tribution of a subsidy to a participating candidate, not a burden on a 
non-participating candidate.  To hold otherwise would overturn dec-
ades of precedent.  Admittedly, however, two members of the Court, 
Justices Scalia and Alito, are unlikely to agree with such an argument, 
as they would have granted an emergency injunction in Respect Maine 
PAC.  The fact that the Supreme Court granted an injunction pend-
ing a petition for certiorari in McComish suggests other members of 
the Court may feel likewise. 
Opponents of rescue funding, by characterizing trigger funding as 
an unfair advantage provided to a non-participating candidate, ulti-
mately threaten much more than just rescue funding.  They, on the 
basis of an argument rejected over thirty years ago by the Supreme 
Court in Buckley, threaten to undermine the central plank upholding 
the constitutionality of all public funding systems:  The finding that 
public financing does not provide a competitive advantage to a par-
ticipating candidate because such candidates “suffer a countervailing 
denial,”361 the imposition of expenditure limits, which are not placed 
on non-participating candidates. 
As the Daggett court observed, no two public financing systems are 
the same.362  The Supreme Court, in considering Arizona’s system, 
would do well to heed this observation.  Some states’ matching fund-
ing provisions may be designed to level the playing field, and thus 
may be unconstitutional.  But others, like that in Arizona, serve a crit-
ical function because the state simply cannot afford to provide a full 
competitive grant to all participating candidates,363 an act that would 
clearly be constitutional.  Thus, at the very least, the Court should 
recognize that a blanket prohibition on matching funding in McCo-
mish would greatly harm the viability of public campaign financing 
systems, which as Buckley makes clear, play an essential role in pre-
venting corruption and ensuring public confidence in our represent-
ative system of government. 
 
361 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95. 
362 Daggett v. Comm. on Govern. Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 469 (1st Cir. 
2000) (“[N]o two public funding schemes are identical, and thus no two evaluations of 
such systems are alike . . . .”). 
363 See Hasen, supra note 24 (“[T]he Court is likely to take away one of the only tools availa-
ble to drafters of public financing measures to make such financing attractive to candi-
dates.”).    
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AUTHOR’S POSTSCRIPT 
As this Comment reached the printer, the Supreme Court was considering 
its decision in McComish v. Bennett.  Should the Court declare rescue fund-
ing unconstitutional in McComish, on the basis of arguments advanced by 
trigger funding opponents and addressed here, I believe that the Comment has 
an important role to play.  Trigger funding opponents assert claims about the 
nature of public financing systems that are not confined to the specific feature 
of trigger provisions.  In this respect, the Comment serves as a starting point 
for analysis of why the Supreme Court’s ruling may ultimately mark a sharp 
turn in the way that the Court conceptualizes all public financing systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
